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Abstract
This paper examines Kant’s philosophy in three parts. Part I concerns knowledge and looks at reason, its limits and extent. This part shows how Kant went beyond the empiricism and rationalism debate by incorporating the key elements of both in his transcendental idealism. I proceed to examine the constructive and critical theories contained in the critiques, arguing that these establish adequate foundations for both scientific knowledge and moral truth. In Part II I show how Kant makes good his promise to bring the worlds of Newton and Rousseau together, combining the mechanistic conception of a causally ordered nature with the belief in the free will. Kant is thus able to secure the basis of objective knowledge with respect to the external world whilst at the same time affirming freedom as the moral responsibility of human beings. This part looks at the moral law and happiness in terms of the highest good, emphasizing that Kant shows how human beings can transcend their natural and egoistic inclinations to create a moral society of cooperation with a view to the common good. In Part III the implications of this ethic is developed with respect to the practical world of politics. There are sections on peace and freedom under law and the republican constitution. As the paper draws to a conclusion it takes a critical look at Kantian rationalism as pertaining to a culture established in too sharp an abstraction from nature. To correct this dualism I identify the basis of a natural teleology in Kant which emphasizes the centrality of moral praxis in realizing the highest good as the morally necessary end of rational nature. The argument is that Kant presents a social and a practical ethics which enjoins us to realize the moral community. In order to realize their rational/moral nature and thus become free beings, empirical individuals must bring about the moral order which embodies the highest good. The primacy of pure practical reason therefore affirms that the world is created by human praxis as a moral praxis and defines Kant’s philosophy as both praxis-orientated and future-oriented.












KANT’S NATURAL TELEOLOGY AND MORAL PRAXIS

 TOC \o "1-3" \h \z INTRODUCTION	2
PART I	6
KNOWLEDGE	6
Reason – Its Limits And Extent	6






The Dialectic Of Reason	22
The Moral Law And The Highest Good	30




Peace And Freedom Under Law	50
The Republican Constitution	57
Kantian Rationalism	64






The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth, i.e. the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking in practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking that is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question.

Marx Thesis II on Feuerbach

Karl Marx was right — if philosophy is to thrive, it requires a stronger practical presence in the world. 

In this paper, I want to develop Kant’s emphasis on creative human agency as a democratisation of ethics and as a democratisation of politics, a process of human growth which is based upon the reason which is innate to human beings as a potentiality for freedom which is capable of being actualised.
Although very difficult, the philosophy of Immanuel Kant repays patient study. Kant reveals human beings to possess a creative, constitutive power, a demiurge, that is independent of some external source and therefore to be the creators of their own reality. 

Kant’s ethico-rational freedom encompasses the central themes of our Hellenic and Judaeo-Christian heritage - Plato’s sublime morality, the Gospel of loving thy neighbour as thyself, the righteous, the poor in spirit, the Protestant emphasis on good works - and it does so without the need for recourse to such elitist or selective notions as Platonic guardians, the ‘chosen people’, the elect, or, reaching into the century after Kant, ‘the revolutionary vanguard’ or ‘the party’. In emphasising the creative power of human reason that is within each and all, Kant conceives human beings as capable of being co-authors of their moral existence and co-legislators in a universal kingdom of ends. 

The philosophy of Immanuel Kant negotiates a path beyond the conflict of knowledge and belief, reason and empiricism, to achieve an intellectually sublime synthesis of ethical and cognitive perspectives. 

In establishing the limits of reason, Kant also shows the extent of its power. Kant is clear that it is only in knowing the limits of reason that one can appreciate its possibilities. Those intoxicated with power are prone to ignore those limits, realising not the freedom being pursued but its opposite. 

In establishing the limits of reality within the confines of reason and nature, Kant actually opened up the possibility of the most expansive moral and rational freedom, a 'kingdom of ends' which is realised in the three dimensions of nature, society and the mind. In impressing its sign upon empirical reality, reason expands the sphere of human freedom. Kant’s normative philosophy presents an ideal of human association as a realm of ends composed of autonomous individuals who are co-legislators of their freedom as rational natural beings.

Whereas once either revelation (religion) or nature (science) had been the fountain-head of morality, Kant makes reason the source of our moral conceptions, giving us the ability to understand and distinguish between good and evil, to prescribe right conduct through the ‘categorical imperative’ and to co-author the universal. The moral law of reason enjoins human beings to live in accordance with the ‘categorical imperative’. The categorical imperative affirms the fundamental equality of rational moral agents, arguing that human beings be treated and treat each other as 'ends in themselves'. True freedom is achieved if, in moral conduct, human beings follow the law of reason only, in contradistinction to natural inclinations, and without regard to practical consequences. 

In fine, Kant’s philosophy transfigures the ideals of transcendence into the ethico-rational freedom of citizens who live as co-legislators in a moral world of their own making. Without any recourse to supernaturalism, Kant’s ethico-rational freedom transcends the world of empirical reality through the power of human reason, rising above the limitations of a world beset by antagonism, desire and natural inclinations. Kant establishes the moral and rational foundation which enables culture and civilization to flourish and enables human beings to forward to a future of 'perpetual peace'.

This paper divides into three parts. Part I concerns the theory of knowledge, and examines Kant’s resolution of key epistemological problems. I examine Kant’s constructive and critical theories to argue that Kant’s great achievement is to have both reconciled and transcended the dualism of empiricism and rationalism, establishing knowledge and morality on firm theoretical and practical foundations.

In Part II, I show the implications of Kant’s ‘transcendental philosophy’ for his ‘metaphysics of morals’. The combination of constructive and critical argumentation in the critiques is shown to supply an adequate foundation for natural science and morality. The second part therefore concerns ethics and revolves around what, for Kant, was the key question - how are human beings able to overcome the inclinations that keep them chained to physical necessity and affirm themselves as free, rational beings? I show that Kant’s transcendental morality is designed to allow human beings to ascend to their higher rational nature, entailing a transition from the phenomenal world of necessity to the intelligible world of freedom. Morality cannot be derived from nature and must inhabit some 'ideal' realm that transcends empirically limited inclinations. Individuals become moral beings only in relation to this 'noumenal' realm. 

Kant’s ethics begs, and receives, an account of the good life as a practical political project. In Part III I examine the practical political implications of Kant’s epistemological and ethical positions. I argue that Kant presents the realm of ends as an idea of reason which is practically necessary if there is to be moral action (CPuR 1965 B 372). Kant’s ideal realm of ends thus exists as a criterion by which to critically evaluate and intervene in the existing political order. I pay particular attention to Kant’s ideal civil constitution which allows ‘the greatest possible human freedom in accordance with laws which ensure that the freedom of each can co-exist with the freedom of all others’ (1965 B.373-374). In the sensible realm, this ideal becomes the 'real object of our willing' (CPrR 1956:121f). I show that, for Kant, this perfect constitution is to be realised as part of the duty to realise the highest good. The question is how this ideal can be realised through practical human action.






Reason – Its Limits And Extent

Before Kant, philosophy was split between empiricist and rationalist theories of knowledge. The rationalists - Descartes, Leibniz and Descartes - argued that the acquisition of knowledge comes primarily through the use of reason. The empiricists – Locke, Berkeley and Hume - argued that knowledge is acquired mainly as a result of experience gained through the senses. It would be no exaggeration to claim that the history of Western philosophy is characterised by this dualism of reason and experience, deciding whether one or the other is the foundational principle of knowledge. 

Kant’s achievement is to have transcended this dualism. Kant’s philosophy encompasses both empiricism and rationalism and is able to combine knowledge and faith. In putting knowledge and morality on firm foundations, Kant fertilises a whole range of modern philosophical approaches, his influence being apparent in phenomenological, ethnomethodological, existentialist, Hegelian, Marxist, Neo-Kantian, and Wittgensteinian thought. As heterogeneous as these philosophical approaches, they are related to Kant by historical origin or conceptual affinity or both. Kant’s philosophical achievements are so immense that it is simply impossible to do them justice in even an extended account. At the same time, it is impossible to understand Kant’s ethics and politics without at least outlining the framework of Kant's system of ideas, locating their place within Kant’s conception of reason.

The Limits Of Reason

By emphasising the active role of human agency in ordering the world of experience, Kant develops a revolutionary way of looking at the theory of knowledge and at metaphysics. His key argument is that the various features of experience, including space, time and causality, are not in themselves features of the external world, but are ways in which the mind organises experience. For instance, we say that time is passing whenever we see a sequence of things, with one thing following another. This seems obvious. We can easily grasp the sequence of events. However, where is the time? Time is not something that exists 'out there' to be seen. Instead, time is part of our mental apparatus, an example of the ways in which the mind organizes its experiences.

In determining exactly what can be said by reason and what cannot, Kant distinguishes between the world of phenomena, the apparent world, and the world of noumena, the unknown and unknowable 'thing-in-itself’. For Kant, the knowledge of the external world of 'phenomena' comes from the experience of the senses as made intelligible and organised by the categories of human reason. The world of 'practical reason' or morality, however, is radically different. Whilst we can know things in the world of phenomena, we cannot know things-in-themselves in the world of noumena. The world of ‘things-in-themselves’ is beyond human experience and is inaccessible to human reason. Kant’s philosophy is therefore a ‘transcendental idealism’, which holds that whilst the noumenal world can be inferred from reason, it is itself another order of being, an intelligible world, a moral order. Human beings are co-creators and co-legislators of this moral world, the world of ‘noumena’, and partake of a real world as distinct from a merely 'phenomenal' world.

For Kant, all scientific and moral judgements are imposed by the mind on the world. This imposition on the part of our mental apparatus is the only way that we are able to apprehend the things of the world. By this, Kant does not deny that there are things which exist independently of the mind. Kant’s point is that things-in-themselves, in being beyond mind, cannot be known. Throughout his various Critiques, Kant went to painstaking lengths to indicate in precise terms what can and what cannot be known by reason. In The Critique of Pure Reason, Kant argues that ‘it is precisely in knowing its limits that philosophy exists.’ Referring to those writers who seek ‘to extend human knowledge beyond all limits of possible experience,’ Kant comments:









In the introduction I made a brief reference to 'rationalism' and ‘empiricism’ as alternative theories of knowledge in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. A simple exposition is in order. The principal difference between rationalists and empiricists lies in the way that they line up their terms. 

A priori knowledge refers to something that is knowable without reference to experience, that is, without the need for any empirical investigation of the world. 
'2 + 4 = 6' is known a priori — there is no need to investigate the world to establish its truth. 
A posteriori knowledge requires empirical investigation to determine the truth. The statement 'the grass is green' is an a posteriori truth that needs to be verified by finding a patch of grass and determining its colour.

To this distinction, Kant adds the distinction between analytic and synthetic statements. In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant is concerned to demonstrate that there are certain concepts or categories of thought - substance and causation, for instance - which cannot be discovered empirically from the world but which are nevertheless required if we are to make sense of the world. Kant proceeds to delineate the nature and justification of these categories or concepts and of the synthetic a priori knowledge that stems from them.

An analytic proposition does not require any more information than is contained in the meanings of the terms involved. The truth of the statement ‘My uncle’s daughter is my cousin’ is self-evidently true on account of understanding the meaning and relation of the words used.
A synthetic statement requires more information than is contained in the analytic statement. 'My cousin is a teacher with pink hair’ brings together (synthesizes) different concepts and thus provides significant information. To determine whether the statement is true or not requires empirical observation to check my cousin’s employment status and hair colour to establish its truth or otherwise.

Thus rationalists hold that significant or meaningful facts about the world can be discovered by rational means without empirical observation and set out to demonstrate the truth of synthetic a priori statements. In contrast, empiricists set out to demonstrate that apparently a priori facts are in fact analytic statements. As in mathematics, ‘1 + 7 = 8’. 

Since Plato (and Pythagoras before him), mathematics has been the paradigm of knowledge within the rationalist tradition, presenting an abstract realm of objects which are capable of being known by the use of reason alone. Empiricists respond by demonstrating that mathematical facts are essentially analytic or trivial or by denying that such facts can be known in this manner. The former route typically takes the form of arguing that what are purported to be the abstract facts of mathematics are actually human constructs and that therefore mathematical reasoning is ultimately a matter of convention. This is not discovery and truth but consensus and proof.

For rationalists, knowledge-claims are valid to the extent that they conform to the deductive standards of proof established by mathematics. Descartes, in common with other rationalists, supposed the capacity to apply universally valid rational principles to be 'equal in all men'. Such rational principles are not derived from experience but are innately known. The notion of innate concepts goes back to Plato and his theory of the Ideal Forms. According to Plato, the objects that we seem to see around us - chairs and tables, trees and mountains, ants and planets - are not what is ultimately real. They are mere approximations of the truly real objects - the forms – the chair and not a particular chair, the table and not a particular table. Reason through our innate knowledge of concepts can give us knowledge of the Forms, the ideal entities that are the true reality.

Plato doesn't just argue that we can have knowledge only of the Forms. He also argues that our concepts are derived from the Forms. When we think, we apply concepts to what we experience, which involves knowing what ‘justice’, 'equality' or 'beauty' or 'rose' mean. These concepts do not derive from experience. The fact that individuals have different experiences implies that we would have different concepts. We cannot, therefore, form concepts by classifying experiences. Communication would be impossible. Instead, we classify experiences by already having concepts. So, Plato concludes, we have innate knowledge of concepts.










The Critique of Pure Reason contains a constructive theory and a critical theory.

To take the constructive theory first, Kant rejects the empiricist argument that the human mind is a blank sheet ready to be filled with sense impressions, the particular things of everyday life which our senses perceive all around us. Rather, for Kant, the human mind possesses basic organising categories or frames of reference which enable us to make sense of these impressions. These categories or frames are 'innate ideas'. Human beings are born with them and they precede any individual's experience of life.

The empiricist view that sense-experience is the source of knowledge and the final arbiter as to its validity can lead to a radical scepticism as to the possibility of knowledge of an external world that is outside the individual consciousness. Whilst this attribute of scepticism makes empiricism an effective weapon in countering mysticism, theology and metaphysics, it is deficient in being able to give an account and a defence of scientific knowledge. To take the most well-known example, the empiricist position holds that the concept of 'causal necessity', implying that possible and impossible courses of future events can be predicted, cannot be derived from our sense-experience. For empiricists, the only thing that can legitimately be inferred from experience is a notion of causality as mere 'constant conjunction', established causal generalisations without any further implications with respect to as yet unexperienced phenomena.

Kant refused to accept such scepticism and subjectivism with respect to the external world outside of the individual consciousness. For Kant, this scepticism and subjectivism renders empiricism defective not only as an account of scientific knowledge, but also with respect to morality. Kant considered Newtonian physics as the embodiment of an absolute knowledge of nature. He also believed Rousseau to have shown the way to moral truth and the universal moral law planted within each and all. Kant thus believed in and sought a way of reconciling both scientific and moral truth.

In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant sought to establish the objectivity of scientific knowledge on secure foundations, combining both rationalist and empiricist epistemologies. Thus, the knowledge expressed in an objective judgment involves both thought (reason) and perception (sense experience). Even judgments of a subjective kind, which make no claim as to objectivity but merely report experiences, need to be organised by the conceptual apparatus innate to human beings imposing order upon them. The mind is active and organises rather than passively records sense-impressions. Perceptual experience is ordered by the a priori forms of space and time. However, perceptual judgments acquire objectivity, that is, become judgments about the existence and nature of an external reality, only if perceptions come to be organised by further a priori concepts of the understanding, what Kant calls ‘categories’. Kant presents twelve 'categories of the understanding', derived from the classification of the logical forms of propositions. 

Simplifying greatly, Kant criticised the empiricist account of knowledge for being obscure and vague in a crucial respect - in its account of how simple sense impressions become 'associated' or 'combined' into more complex ideas and concepts. For example, one could see how sense impressions could 'give' one the idea of ‘blue’, ‘green’, ‘yellow’, etc., but not how, in themselves, they could 'give' one the idea of colour. For there is no sense impression which is 'colour'. Another way of saying this is to argue that sense impressions can yield knowledge of particular nouns, but not of abstract nouns. Moreover, Kant argues, there are other, even more fundamental, concepts for human beings (he mentions especially the concepts of time and space) which are not derivable by association, contrast, or by anything else from sense impressions.


The argument is close and detailed but the basic character of Kant's defence of scientific knowledge can be gleaned by examining his treatment of the category of causality. Kant agrees with the empiricists that the concept of causal necessity cannot be abstracted from experience, but he rejects the empiricist conclusion that knowledge therefore has no rational foundation. On the contrary, the legitimacy of objective causal judgments is to be assumed, with the condition of their possibility to be sought thereafter. Kant finds this condition of possibility of objective causal judgments in the organisation of the 'manifold' of our perceptual experience through the application of an a priori concept of causality, that is, a concept of causality that is not abstracted or derived from experience. Going further, a condition of the objectivity of the whole system of judgments comprising our scientific knowledge of nature is that the a priori categories are applied within it in accordance with certain 'synthetic a priori' principles. These a priori principles establish the rules for the application of the a priori categories. With respect to the category of causality, the appropriate synthetic a priori principle is that 'all alterations occur in accordance with the law of the connexion of cause and effect' (CPuR 1964:218). 
Kant does not oppose the innate mental apparatus of human beings to empirical nature in terms of crude antithesis and offers much more than a retread of rationalism versus empiricism in philosophy. Rather, Kant argues that all knowledge requires both input from the senses and organization by concepts. Both sensory inputs and organizing concepts have pure forms that we can know a priori, and hence know to be universally and necessarily valid. The pure forms of ordinary sensory inputs - what Kant calls empirical intuition - are the structures of space and time studied by mathematics; the pure forms of ordinary empirical concepts are the pure concepts of the understanding - the categories – and these are what makes it possible to apply the various aspects and forms of judgment studied by logic to objects of experience. Mathematics contains synthetic a priori judgments that are universally and necessarily true of all appearances, and must be derived from the construction of mathematical objects in pure intuition rather than from the analysis of concepts; the categories yield synthetic a priori principles when applied to experience with its necessarily spatio-temporal structure - the principles of the conservation of substance and of the universality of causation for instance. 
In affirming the need for principles which are both a priori (independent of experience) and synthetic (not merely true by definition), Kant draws on both rationalist and empiricist traditions. If Kant clearly theorises out of the rationalist tradition, he nevertheless accepts the truth of the empiricist case, arguing that synthetic a priori principles can be legitimately employed only within the bounds of possible sense-experience.
This notion that categories and principles may be legitimately employed only within the field of 'phenomena' may be considered a limitation on their scope only if one supposes the existence of un-experienceable realities. This is what Kant's theory of judgment does indeed suppose. The ultimate (or transcendental) presupposition of the combination of a priori categories of the understanding with a subjective perceptual judgment achieves the unity of the judging and perceiving subject within a single objective judgment. This unity is a 'transcendental' unity in that it transcends possible experience in being an ultimate condition of experience, and which is different in kind from anything to be found within experience.
Kant therefore concluded that the empiricist account is wrong and that the human mind is not a tabula rasa, a blank sheet, ready, at birth, to be filled with sense impressions. On the contrary, in order to make sense of - to use - sense impressions, the human mind must already at birth be possessed of certain basic organizing categories or frames of reference into which those sense impressions are fitted or through which they are filtered. These organizing categories or frames of reference are often called 'innate ideas', 'innate' because they precede any individual human being's experience of life. Kant is plainly working in the tradition of Plato here, recalling the importance that Plato assigned to innate concepts as the key to being able to apprehend true reality. These innate ideas or concepts come with all human beings 'out of the womb', and are independent of experience. We are born with them, they are part of our heritage as members of the species homo sapiens. These categories constitute the core of our faculty of reason, which, for Kant, as for Plato and Aristotle before him, is the central faculty distinguishing human beings from all other animals.




This is the constructive theory of the Critique of Pure Reason. The Critique also contains a critical theory. 

Whilst Kant’s constructive philosophy emphasises the creative constitutive human power and is full of reality making implications, Kant is careful to emphasise limits in his critical theory. The innate categories impose order on chaos but also impose limits on experience, determining the extent of what human beings can know. Human beings can seek causal explanations regarding everyday experience - Who put that table there? What made that noise? But there are questions to which causal explanations cannot be applied, human free will, the origin of the universe, and so on. The answers to such questions can often result in antinomy, possibilities which, though equally rational and plausible are nevertheless mutually exclusive. For instance, it seems equally plausible that human beings possess free choice and that every human act has a determined cause. Similarly, the views that the universe at one time didn't exist or that it has always existed and always will exist (Aristotle’s eternalism) seem equally implausible.
For Kant, such antinomies suggest there are limits to reason which prevent us from ever fully understanding certain things. This is the basis of Kant's transcendental idealism. Whilst human beings can only ever experience their own innate perceptions through categories of experience (idealism), there is a reality that exists beyond (transcends) these categories.

In his Critiques, Kant established the limits of reason in order to establish what can be known. The importance of Kant lies in the way that he is able to balance the claims of scientific knowledge and moral truth, thus developing a rational ethics with a practical import. Kant's most striking statement in this respect is his claim in the Preface to the second edition of the Critique that he ‘found it necessary to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith’ (CPuR B xxx).

Kant explained what he meant by this in Section III of Chapter II of the "Dialectic" of the second Critique, the section aptly entitled "On the Primacy of Practical Reason." This text bears a close explication. 

In the Preface to the second edition of the Critique, Kant informs us that the Critique is an essential preparation for a proper grounding of morality, even though it will not in itself supply a theory of morality (Bxxv). This will in turn provide the correct, rational foundation for religion. It is at this point that Kant states that he 'found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith' (Bxxx). In a section entitled ‘The Canon of Pure Reason’, contained in the Transcendental Doctrine of Method, Kant concludes his strategy for solving the problem of metaphysics by demonstrating that Critical philosophy is able to bring harmony to reason and thus validate the moral order through its vindication of the metaphysics of experience and criticism of transcendent metaphysics. The Canon therefore outlines the contours of the future development of the Critical system, the architecture of which is built upon three key questions (A804—5/B832-3):

1	What can I know?
2	What ought I to do?
3	What may I hope?

Epistemology and ethics wrapped up in a rational religion capable of motivating action. 

Kant thus presents the concepts of hope and faith as the central theme of the doctrine of the postulates. He states that the doctrine of postulates is concerned with the question, "What may I hope for?" (CPuR, A 805/B 833). On first impression, the view that it is necessary ‘to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith’ (CPuR, B xxx) would appear to set hope and faith in opposition. For Kant, however, hope and faith are complementary and constitute a single matter. The faith that Kant refers to is a special type of knowledge, common (in principle) to all rational beings. Hope (as grounded hope) is the affective response that faith arouses in each individual. Faith and hope are therefore two interrelated aspects of the same awareness. The relation is one-way, from faith to hope, faith being prior to hope both logically and temporally (Yovel 1980 ch 2). 

The critical theory of the Critique holds that we can use the pure concepts of the understanding to conceive of objects that lie beyond the limits of our sensible intuition through our power of inferential reason. We can, for instance, imagine a spatio-temporal universe that has a kind of completeness that our indefinitely extendable actual intuitions can never have; we can imagine objects that cannot be represented in sensory experience at all, such as freedom, God or an immaterial soul. However, such conceptions do not amount to knowledge, in the strict scientific sense, and the errors of traditional metaphysics can be attributed to claims that they do. But Kant goes further than this denial of claims to knowledge to affirm a view of human powers which holds that none of these pure concepts fails to have a proper use if only we understand it correctly (G, 4:395). Kant proceeds to argue that the field of moral experience yields evidence for a reality that underlies and yet is beyond the phenomenal world. This is the world of 'noumena', the world of things-in-themselves. Kant’s point is that whilst knowledge of the existence of our own freedom, as well as God and the immortal soul cannot be theoretically demonstrated, neither can they be disproven. These ideas are necessary presuppositions of moral conduct — objects of moral belief or faith rather than knowledge. Kant thus brought the controversy between science and religion to a conclusion which both sides could live with.
The nature of Kant’s solution, centred on ‘practical ideas’, merits extensive treatment. 
For Kant, all metaphysics issues in the practical "ideas" of ‘freedom’, ‘God’, and ‘immortality’. These ‘ideas’ are the necessary supports of morality, the conditions that are required for the objectivity of moral experience. These 'ideas', by which reference to the noumenal world beyond possible experience can be made, possess a special character. 





Unlike the categories of the understanding, the ideas of 'God', 'freedom' and 'immortality' are neither abstracted or derived from experience nor applicable within it. Kant defines the ‘ideas’ of God, freedom and immortality as 'ideas of pure reason' in order to distinguish them from the 'forms' of perception (space, time) and the categories of the understanding (cause, substance and attribute, etc.) Since these ‘ideas’ are neither abstracted or derived from experience nor applicable to experience, their use is subject to severe limitations. Whenever these ‘ideas’ are misused, Kant argues, our thinking strays into an 'absolute' or 'speculative' metaphysics. As a result of spuriously applying the ideas of pure reason to objects of experience, our thinking falls into hopeless confusion and contradiction. The same deficiencies occur from the other direction, when the categories of the understanding are applied to the noumenal realm.

Kant is firmly working in the tradition of Plato (CPuR, A312-20/B369-77), arguing that the ideas of pure reason have a legitimate use, or yield a "canon" (A 795—831 /B 823—59), but in morality rather than science. Knowledge of the existence of God, of immortality and of the immaterial soul is impossible; these are incapable of rational theoretical demonstration. That, for both rationalists and empiricists, would seem to bring the matter to a negative conclusion. Not so, Kant argues. Knowledge of human freedom is also incapable of theoretical demonstration, but this is not the end of freedom as a value. Human beings continue to think and act as though human freedom is real, an integral part of Being, implying that there is an underlying moral truth which is beyond rational scientific demonstration but which, in its practical effect, is no less real for that. Kant’s solution is to argue that whilst God, immortality and freedom cannot be theoretically proven, neither can they be disproven. They are objects of moral belief or faith rather than knowledge, necessary presuppositions of moral conduct. Hence Kant’s statement that he found it necessary "to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith" (CPuR B xx). 

Whatever their limitations, the ‘ideas of pure reason’ have important uses in theory and practice. In their theoretical use, the ideas can give rise to 'regulative maxims' by which we attempt to systematise, and thus make more coherent, our theorising with respect to the external world. More important than even this, however, is the practical use of the ideas. In being conditions of the objectivity of moral experience, the ‘ideas of pure reason’, the ideas of God, freedom and the immortal soul, are indispensable to practical morality. Kant is clear about the significance of this practical use. Although we can have no (strict scientific) knowledge of the objects of the ideas, Kant insists upon the importance of these ideas for moral life. Since knowledge requires both thought and perception, things-in-themselves in the noumenal world are, by definition, unperceivable and unknowable. Since they are objects whose existence is thinkable, we may therefore have faith in them, and hence they are conditions of the objectivity of moral experience. However, in terms of strict scientific knowledge, the nature of these objects is unknowable.

Kant’s work in the Critique is not merely negative, showing the limits of reason, but positive, showing what reason can achieve.

On a cursory view of the present work it may seem that its results are merely negative, warning us that we must never venture with speculative reason beyond the limits of experience. Such is in fact its primary use. But such teaching at once acquires a positive value when we recognise that the principles with which speculative reason ventures out beyond its proper limits do not in effect extend the employment of reason, but, as we find on closer scrutiny, inevitably narrow it. These principles properly belong [not to reason but] to sensibility, and when thus employed they threaten to make the bounds of sensibility coextensive with the real, and so to supplant reason in its pure (practical) employment. So far, therefore, as our Critique limits speculative reason, it is indeed negative; but since it thereby removes an obstacle which stands in the way of the employment of practical reason, nay threatens to destroy it, it has in reality a positive and very important use. At least this is so, immediately we are convinced that there is an absolutely necessary practical employment of pure reason—the moral—in which it inevitably goes beyond the limits of sensibility.

Kant CPuR B xxv






The Dialectic Of Reason

For Kant, this combination of constructive and critical argumentation provided an adequate foundation for all of philosophy. Kant’s attention now turned from ‘transcendental philosophy’ to a revision of ‘metaphysics’ through the application of the synthetic a priori principles of experience in the Critique to the most elementary concepts of natural science and morality. However, before Kant could begin the ‘Metaphysics of Morals’ he had been promising since the 1760s, he saw the need for further foundational work. This work developed the arguments set out in the first two critiques.

For Kant, the central aspect of the human predicament concerns how human beings are able to transcend the inclinations that keep them chained to natural necessity by ascending to their higher rational nature, moving from the phenomenal world of necessity to the intelligible world of freedom. This transition entails humanity moving beyond the limitations of egoism and individual self-interest to realise the greater good that is attained from all acting in common. Kant’s philosophy therefore involves a distinction between culture, as constituted in the sphere of reason, and nature. Reason is transcendentally constituted and legislates to the empirical world from which it is separated (Rundell 1989:14). Morality remains outside the empirical limitations of the temporal sphere as a point towards which human beings aspire. Kant's morality is formal or transcendental in the sense that it seeks a ground for right not by means of an extrapolation from the empirical properties of human beings but in the critique of the rational mind (CPuR 1965 B.473-480). Universality requires that freedom be grounded in something that transcends empirically limited inclinations, the will. Moral values cannot be drawn from nature and must inhabit some supersensible, 'ideal', realm. Only in relation to this 'noumenal' realm could individuals become moral beings (CPuR 1965 B.334/6 498ff; CPrR 1956 50ff).

Kant thus makes good his promise to bring the worlds of Newton and Rousseau together, combining the mechanistic conception of a causally ordered, 'deterministic' nature with the belief in the free will. He does this by securing the basis of objective knowledge of the external world whilst at the same time affirming the moral responsibility of human beings.

Freedom is the capacity of human beings to act independently of natural causality and against natural 'inclinations', the desires and impulses elicited in the human psyche through objects in the natural world (CPuR 1965 B.561f; cf. CPrR 1956:72 118f 161). Kant’s rational will is thus free from any ground of determination in nature (Taylor 1975:368/9). A free act is morally significant in being exempt from 'blind causality' in both physical and psychological senses (CPuR 1965 B.826f; CPrR 1956:95).

Moral principles which are logically independent of experience can be justified only if human beings are understood to be not merely phenomenal beings, subject to causal necessity, but also noumenal beings who are free. Morality is possible only if the will is free to act. The concept of freedom is wholly a priori and forms part of a coherent system of 'ideas of reason' (CPuR 1965 B.390-396), a rationally constructed standard not found in experience but according to which empirical actions can be judged (CPuR 1965 B.370ff). This system of ideas is constructed by the systematic application of reason through a faculty shared by all human beings and is 'objective’ in that human beings can agree about its nature and resolve disputes by reference to it.
Kant thus affirms creative human agency in both cognitive and moral senses in a way which transcends any kind of natural determinism. For Kant, the human subject actively participates in both the phenomenal world and the noumenal world. Human beings are active parts of the worlds they see and experience around them. As a part of the phenomenal world, the human agent is an object of possible experience, through external sense with respect to other selves and through introspection with respect to oneself, and is also a part of the causal order of nature. Our desires, impulses and inclinations belong to this phenomenal aspect of ourselves. However, the self, as a part of the noumenal world, is not an object of possible experience (by definition) and therefore falls outside the scope of the synthetic a priori categories and the principles of natural science, including the notion of causality. In this way, Kant creates the conceptual space for a 'noumenal' subject which is not subject to causal determination and is possessed of a free will. The human being is therefore a moral agent capable of subjecting himself or herself to universal moral duties.

Freedom is the capacity of reason to initiate action, lawfully, apart from inclination and hence independently of ‘blind’ natural causality (CPuR 1965 B.46 50 B.566ff). Kantian autonomy may be defined in terms of the idea of freedom as the causality of reason in accordance with the moral law as a 'fact of reason' (e.g. GMM), a 'necessary' concept which human beings must construct on account of knowledge of the moral law (CPuR 1965 B.476 585f; CPrR 1956:21-29 32). Human beings, therefore, are capable of autonomy, in the sense of acting according to laws they have given themselves. This is the position that Kant develops at length in the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785).

In the Groundwork, Kant demonstrated that the fundamental principle of morality can be derived from both the common-sense notion of a good will as the only thing of unconditional value (Section I) and from the philosophical conception of a categorical imperative (Section II). Kant proceeded to argue that we must have free will and that any being with free will can act in accordance with the fundamental principle of morality (Section III).

For Kant, moral experience is distinguished through its connection with the idea of duty. Kant argues that the individual is subject to universal duties, which command obedience in opposition to the desires, impulses or inclinations of the particular moment. A condition of possibility of the objectivity of moral experience is not simply the existence of such universal duties, but the fact that the individual will can be determined by these duties in contradistinction to the determinations of desires, impulses and inclinations. One could write ‘natural’ desires and the like here, but this would give the misleading impression that Kant is asserting a simple reason/nature dualism. Not so. For Kant, reason is as innate as desires, inclinations and impulses and can be employed to transcend these appetitive limitations by enabling us to recognise the universal duties commanded by the moral law.

On this basis, Kant resolves the problem of the disjunction between the determinism of the causally ordered world of phenomena and the radical indeterminism of moral human agency.

As natural beings, human beings belong to the sensible world. In this world, individual actions are determined by the laws of nature and the regularities of physical cause and effect. This is the aspect of human behaviour that physics, biology, and neuroscience can describe and explain. But there is more to human life than such scientific description and explanation. As rational beings, human beings inhabit an intelligible world. This world has an independence of the laws of nature and physical causality. For Kant, it is only from the standpoint of this intelligible world that human beings are free.

As a rational being, and consequently as belonging to the intelligible world, man can never conceive the causality of his own will except under the Idea of freedom; for to be independent of determination by causes in the sensible world (and this is what reason must always attribute to itself) is to be free. To the Idea of freedom there is inseparably attached the concept of autonomy, and to this in turn the universal principle of morality—a principle which in Idea forms the ground for all the actions of rational beings, just as the law of nature does for all appearances.

Kant GMM 1991: 453

At the very core of the Metaphysics of Morals is the categorical imperative. The categorical imperative is possible since human beings are members of an intelligible world. A rational being, qua intelligence, belongs to the intelligible world. However, the human being is also a natural being, a part of the sensible world, where actions are encountered as mere appearances of physical causality. Yet the possibility of these actions cannot be made intelligible by means of such causality, since human beings have no direct acquaintance with this. Rather, since these actions belong to the sensible world, they have to be understood as determined by other appearances—namely, by desires and inclinations. 

Hence, if I were solely a member of the intelligible world, all my actions would be in perfect conformity with the principle of the autonomy of a pure will; if I were solely a part of the sensible world, they would have to be taken as in complete conformity with the law of nature governing desires and inclinations —that is, with the heteronomy of nature. (In the first case they would be grounded on the supreme principle of morality; in the second case on that of happiness.) But the intelligible world contains the ground of the sensible world and therefore also of its laws; and so in respect of my will, for which (as belonging entirely to the intelligible world) it gives laws immediately, it must also be conceived as containing such a ground. Hence, in spite of regarding myself from one point of view as a being that belongs to the sensible world, I shall have to recognise that, qua intelligence, I am subject to the law of the intelligible world—that is, to the reason which contains this law in the Idea of freedom, and so to the autonomy of the will— and therefore I must look on the laws of the intelligible world as imperatives for me and on the actions which conform to this principle as duties.
And in this way categorical imperatives are possible because the Idea of freedom makes me a member of an intelligible world. This being so, if I were solely a member of the intelligible world, all my actions would invariably accord with the autonomy of the will; but because I intuit myself at the same time as a member of the sensible world, they ought so to accord. This categorical 'ought' presents us with a synthetic a priori proposition, since to my will as affected by sensuous desires there is added the Idea of the same will, viewed, however, as a pure will belonging to the intelligible world and active on its own account—a will which contains the supreme condition of the former will, so far as reason is concerned. This is roughly like the way in which concepts of the understanding, which by themselves signify nothing but the form of law in general, are added to intuitions of the sensible world and so make synthetic a priori propositions possible on which all our knowledge of nature is based.

Kant GMM 1991: 453/4

Conceiving ourselves as creative, choosing, conscious agents and not merely as objects of causal processes and natural laws, we can act freely, make moral choices, assume moral responsibility for our actions and hold other people morally responsible for their actions. If we repudiate this notion and instead insist, like the neuroscientist Francis Crick, that ‘you’re nothing but a pack of neurons’, and that human freedom and moral responsibility are therefore utter illusions, then Kant's account can't prove us wrong. But Kant’s response would be that, without a conception of freedom and morality as more than illusions, we would have the utmost difficulty in understanding ourselves and making sense of our lives. Crick’s reductionist claim paraphrases Lewis Carroll’s Alice in Alice in Wonderland: ‘Who cares for you?’ said Alice (she had grown to her full size by this time). 'You're nothing but a pack of cards!' Alice was addressing inanimate objects, a pack of cards, not human beings. She was putting the human case against things and illusions. And that’s Kant’s point, human beings, as rational beings, members of the intelligible world, are capable of moral choice and action, they can care and do care for each other in a way that inanimate things and physical processes do not. In becoming moral beings, exercising moral choice in relation to others in an intelligible world, human beings grow to their full size.





As natural beings and rational beings simultaneously, human beings live in the realms of necessity and freedom. 





From this there arises what Kant calls ‘a dialectic of reason’. Whilst the freedom attributed to the will seems incompatible with the necessity of nature, with natural necessity much more serviceable for purposes of speculation, ‘for purposes of action the footpath of freedom is the only one on which we can make use of reason in our conduct.’ 

Hence to argue freedom away is us as impossible for the most abstruse philosophy as it is for the most ordinary human reason. Reason must therefore suppose that no genuine contradiction is to be found between the freedom and the natural necessity ascribed to the very same human actions; for it can abandon the concept of nature as little as it can abandon that of freedom.


Kant concludes that whilst we shall never be able to comprehend how freedom is possible, ‘if the thought of freedom is self-contradictory or incompatible with nature—a concept which is equally necessary—freedom would have to be completely abandoned in favour of natural necessity.’ (GMM 1991: 456).

It follows from this that physics, biology, evolutionary psychology and neuroscience, no matter how sophisticated, can only investigate nature and inquire into the empirical world, and cannot answer moral questions or prove or disprove free will. Science can yield knowledge of the external world and physical processes, but cannot pronounce on moral questions. Morality and freedom are not empirical concepts. Whilst we cannot prove that morality and freedom exist, we can only make sense of our lives as rational beings by presupposing their existence. 

The Moral Law And The Highest Good

At the heart of Kant’s normative philosophy is the moral requirement for human beings to transform society in order to realise the summum bonum, the highest good: 'The moral law .. determines for us ..a final purpose toward which it obliges us to strive, and this purpose is the highest good in the world possible through freedom' (CJ 1951:30). Human beings, therefore, have a duty to promote the highest good: 'We are a priori determined by reason to promote with all our powers the summum bonum, which consists in the combination of the greatest welfare of rational beings with the highest condition of the good itself, i.e., in universal happiness conjoined with morality most accordant to law' (CJ 1951:304).

The way that the end of the highest good enjoins individuals to promote the happiness of each other implies a social ethics which is actualised as a moral community. This social ethics, concerned with promoting the highest good, is expressed in the way that the categorical imperative entails ideal co-legislative institutions in which human beings treat each other as ends. The end of the categorical imperative is the harmony of free and rational wills.





This idea establishes Kant's ethics as concerned with the public life of human beings who, as social and rational beings, realise their nature in association with each other. Rather than confine moral efforts to the private realm, Kant's ethics express a social demand oriented towards realising an ideal that is both moral and political, the ideal of the perfect civil constitution and of international peace (Van Der Linden 1985:4 5). The moral law, as defined in the categorical imperative, grounds the pursuit of the perfect state as a social duty, embodying the highest good of the moral community.

Kant argues that there is such a thing as moral truth and that this truth can be clearly shown to be grounded in reason. The ‘categorical imperative’ is at the heart of the universal realm delineated by Kant. The categorical imperative is the general moral law, the objective principle of morality, categorically enjoining individuals to act in accordance with morality.
The categorical imperative is the form that the fundamental principle of morality assumes when applied to imperfectly rational creatures like human beings. The principle originates in human reason; it is something we impose upon ourselves rather than being something externally imposed upon us by another ruler, divine or human. Nevertheless, despite its origins in human reason, the principle has the character of a constraint given the existence of desires and impulses which incline us to act contrary to the principle if unrestrained (G, 4:412—14).
As distinct from an hypothetical imperative, which indicates the means which must be willed or employed relative to the realisation of some further end (GMM 1991:79), an imperative is categorical when expressed as an unconditional demand that possesses its own validity. This yields a universal principle for all rational beings and valid and necessary principles for every volition. This is The Formula of Universal Law: 'Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law' (GMM 1991:84). 
In arguing for the coincidence of the freedom of each individual and all individuals, so that everyone acts only on maxims that can be willed to become universal laws, Kant’s moral law exists as a universal law (Van Der Linden 1985:20). Kant’s categorical imperative in its various formulae requires that we act only on "maxims" or principles of action that can be "universalized" in the sense that they can be accepted and acted on by all who would be affected by individual actions. Further, principles must be universalizable since every person, ourselves as well as all others, must always be treated as ends and ‘never simply as a means’ (GMM 1991: 32 91). If each person respected the principle of universalizability and acted on the categorical imperative in accordance with this principle, the result would be a "realm of ends," a "whole of all ends in systematic connection (a whole both of rational beings as ends in themselves and of the ends of his own that each may set himself") (G 4:433). In the realm of ends each person is intrinsically valuable and is treated as an end, not as a mere means to ends which are external to them. This is a universal realm in which the particular ends set by each person are promoted by all persons to the extent that this can consistently be done. Thus the formulation demands that the moral agent act always so that the will through its maxims could regard itself at the same time as 'making universal law' (GMM 1991:94).
The concept of a rational being, legislating universally by all maxims of its will so as to judge itself and its actions from this perspective derives from the Formula of the End in Itself: 'Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end' (GMM 1991:91).

Kant's reference to 'humanity' in general rather than 'persons' in particular here is significant. In addressing the universal humanity in each individual, how humanity can and ought to be, Kant's ethics are social rather than private. This ‘humanity’ is the final end of the individual, the highest good as the conception of the moral community applied in order to transform the human condition. The duties to oneself are duties to all: 'To destroy the subject of morality in one’s person is to root out the existence of morality itself from the world, so far as this is in one's power; and yet morality is an end in itself. Consequently, to dispose of oneself as a mere means to an arbitrary end is to abase humanity in one's own person (homo noumenon), which was yet entrusted to man (homo phaenomenon) for its preservation (DV 1964:85). 'Humanity' is the final end of the individual, the highest good as the conception of the moral community applied to transform the human condition.

Kant did not, therefore, leave his categorical principle as an abstract and formal statement. The ethic of ends puts 'flesh on the bones’ of the first formulation by indicating what kind of maxims could be willed as universal laws; human beings not using themselves or others as means to subjective ends implies a view of what right actions are. The view that the individual ought not be subject to another will implies that the individual should be considered as his/her own law-giver. 

Kant’s ethic therefore enables us to identify the forms of justice required by the realm of ends in the social and political world of human beings. The implementation of the abstract ideal of the realm of ends could thus be grounded in human reality as lived through an analysis of private property, contract, and family. Whilst Hegel would take this much further in his concept of the Sittlichkeit, the system of the ethical life, I shall later come to Kant’s much neglected political writings to show that Kant has more to say in this area than has generally been appreciated. Kant, that is, proceeded to derive the public institutions and private virtues which are required to maintain these forms of justice to realise ends and hence achieve happiness (Guyer 2006 ch 1).

Kant’s formulae therefore entail a public and a social ethic, delineating a common purpose and good, as opposed to a merely private ethic which concerns individuals alone. Kant’s categorical principle is not to be limited to defining a procedure for the pursuit of private ends, with happiness achieved only indirectly, since it applies to all so that everyone acts only on maxims that can be willed to become universal laws (Van Der Linden 1988:20). Once maxims are submitted to the test of universality in this manner, the pursuit of private ends no longer issues in conflict but in a harmony of free and rational wills, the individual agent respecting the categorical imperative through respect for the moral law in abstraction from objects.
The obligation to obey the moral law charges humanity with the duty to promote the highest good. In submitting their maxims to the test of universality, individual agents are creating a moral community in which each person is reciprocally end and means (CJ 1951:222). 

Kant's harmony of free and rational wills is, therefore, more than a framework for the individual pursuit of private ends, in which any claim to achieving universal happiness can only be realised indirectly. The end of the moral community affirms that individual members directly contribute to the happiness of each other, so long as this meets the test of universality. Not the individual alone but all individuals together make the ends of others their own end so that universal happiness is directly promoted. 

In equating the realm of means with the world of natural things, and the realm of ends with that of pure, self-determined intelligences, Kant offers a practical ethic which challenges the inversion of means and ends and rejects the reduction of value to price in the social world. The universal practical law proposed by Kant derives from the objective principle of the will formed out of the conception of 'rational nature’ as an 'end in itself’ (GMM 1991:91). 'Man in the system of nature', Kant states, 'has an ordinary value', but man as the 'subject of a morally practical reason' is 'exalted above all price'. As homo noumenon, 'he is not to be valued merely as a means to the ends of other people, or even to his own ends, but is to be prized as an end in himself’ (DV 1964:96/7). Kant is able to oppose the moral self-determination of human beings as ends in themselves against an external determinism which reduces human beings to mere means. For Kant, beings dependent on nature rather than on will have only a relative worth as means and are therefore called 'things'. Rational beings are not ‘things’ but are 'persons', since their nature indicates that they are ends in themselves. Kant’s ethic therefore opposes all modes of thought, action and organisation which reduce human beings to mere means. The individual as a rational being 'exists as an end in himself, not merely a means for arbitrary use by this or that will', but 'must in all his actions .. always be viewed at the same time as an end' (GMM 1991:90). This entails a demand that the modes and social relations by which human beings organise their existence should treat human beings as ends in themselves and enable human beings to treat each other as ends in themselves.

The Formula of Autonomy establishes that 'the will is .. not merely subject to the law but is so subject that it must be considered as also making the law for itself and precisely on this account as first of all subject to the law (of which it can regard itself as the author)' (GMM 1991:93). In acting out of respect for the moral law, the moral agent wills himself/herself and others as legislative selves (noumenal selves) and therefore as colegislators in a moral order of universal cooperation (GMM 1991:98/9; Van Der Linden 1988:30). 
Thus, whilst the realm of means is equated with the world of natural things, the realm of ends is equated with that of pure, self-determined intelligences. But not in any atomistic sense. Kant’s ethic is practical, social and co-operative. For each to treat others as ends in themselves respects the demand that individual agents should co-operate together create a society of co-legislators, with each concerned to promote all other's ends. Freedom is attained through the unity of each individual and all individuals, and not through the assertion of individual ends over against those of others. Genuine individual freedom is therefore a collective endeavour, recognising the social nature of human beings. Treating humanity in oneself and in others as an end in itself is to act according to only those maxims which can become universal laws or laws of nature. To treat people as ends in themselves respects the demand that individual agents should create a society of legislators concerned to promote each other's ends. Thus the Formula of Autonomy demands: ‘So act that your will can regard itself at the same time as making universal law through its maxim.’ (GMM 1991:94). The moral agent acts so that his or her will, through its maxims, works also for the general good.

The fundamental worth individuals seek for themselves from other subjects they also acknowledge in other subjects (Cassirer 1981:248/9). This is a conception which leads to a community of rational beings constituting their selfhood and self-worth in expansive relation with the moral individuality of all others. 

This concept of every rational being 'as one who must regard himself as making universal law by all the maxims of his will' leads to the 'closely connected' concept of the realm of ends (GMM 1991:95). The mutual growth of individuals as ends culminates in the realm of ends as 'a systematic union of rational beings under common objective laws ... Since these laws are directed precisely to the relation of such beings to one another as ends and means, this kingdom can be called a kingdom of ends’ (GMM 1991:95). This 'systematic union of different rational beings' (GMM 1991:95) exists as an ‘Ideal’ of humanity as it ‘ought to be’, an ideal realm in which human beings act as moral agents, and respect and treat each other as legislators and as ends in themselves: 'A rational being belongs to the kingdom of ends as a member, when, although he makes its universal laws, he is also himself subject to these laws. He belongs to it as its head [sovereign], when as the maker of laws he is himself subject to the will of no other' (GMM 1991:95). 


In the realm of ends, each individual upholds and promotes the conditions of autonomy for all other individuals. Moreover, by making the moral law their own end, individual agents join together to constitute the moral community in which each furthers the ends of the other their common end, thus realising the highest good for each and all (Van Der Linden 1988:32/3 38). The realm of ends, therefore, is composed not merely of monadic legislators, discrete individuals who lack relation to and interaction with each other, but of colegislators in a reciprocal community: 'every rational being must so act as if he were through his maxims always a lawmaking member in the universal kingdom of ends' (GMM 1991:100).

With each submitting their maxims to the test of universality, the pursuit of private ends no longer issues in conflict amongst all but instead generates a harmony of free and rational wills in a ‘realm of ends’ in which each person is both end and means at the same time. Kant thus presents an ideal of humanity as it ought to be, thriving in a realm of universal cooperation in which moral agents treat each other as ends in themselves.

Kant's ethics are democratic in affirming every person to be a rational being and therefore to be competent to make universally legislative decisions. Each member treating all others as moral beings requires liberty (every individual is able to decide for themselves); equality (every individual equally has the power to make choices and decisions); and fraternity (every individual is a member of a moral community) (Raphael 1981:57; Norman 1983:102/3).

In such an ideal community, Kant reasons, 'all the actions of rational beings take place just as if they had proceeded from a supreme will that comprehends in itself, or under itself, all private wills' (CPR A810/B838).
Such an ideal community is an Idea derived from the supersensible world, which is governed by the morally perfect ruler (A812/B840). Kant calls it a corpus mysticum (mystical body) of rational beings (A808/B836). So he postulates the supersensible world as a moral kingdom. The highest good is demanded by pure reason. This begs some crucial questions: What practical purchase can such a supersensible Ideal have? What is the relation of reason to nature? Is nature wholly without moral significance?

In passing, it is worth commenting on Richard Dawkins’ assertion in The Selfish Gene (2006: 3/4) that we need to teach generosity and altruism in order to build a society of cooperation and the common good, since we can expect ‘little help from biological nature’. This is a basic theme in philosophy, and receives extensive and intricate treatment in Kant. Praising Charles Darwin, Dawkins asks the questions ‘Is there a meaning to life? What are we for? What is man?’, then quotes the zoologist G. G. Simpson: 'The point I want to make now is that all attempts to answer that question before 1859 are worthless and that we would be better off if we ignore them completely.' In the Endnotes, Dawkins defends Simpson’s blunt assertion thus: ‘can you, as a matter of fact, think of any that are not now worthless except for their (considerable) historic interest? There is such a thing as being just plain wrong, and that is what, before 1859, all answers to those questions were.’ That justification of ignorance perhaps explains why Dawkins thinks that he is being original when restating the oldest question in philosophy’s book:





Kant shows us how we can transcend our natural urges, desires and inclinations and create a moral society of cooperation with a view to the common good.


Happiness And The Highest Good

Kant presents the highest good as the ultimate normative Idea. This highest good has two parts for Kant: happiness and morality as the worthiness for happiness. The moral good is not sufficient for human beings because they need happiness. However, happiness alone cannot be the highest good for rational beings, since human beings ought to be morally good so as to deserve happiness. The happiness of human beings should be commensurate with their morality. This rational ideal of concord between morality and happiness can only be realized in a perfect community of rational beings, where human beings are true moral agents, that is, the authors of their own morals and happiness (A809/B837).

It is morally significant whether an act is done from duty or from inclination since for Kant it is only in actions done from duty that individuals exercise their freedom, their capacity to act as autonomous beings independent of and superior to the natural or sensible world (CPrR 1956:89/90). Only actions which are done 'from duty' possess moral worth and exhibit a good will (GMM 1991:62/5 1956:84 87/8 DV 1964:50 52/3 R 1960:25). To act 'from duty' is to act out of respect for the moral law, rather than from inclination or from expectation of desirable consequences (GMM 1991:66). The view that the moral worth of an action resides in its consequences reduces the good will to being an efficient cause of good action rather than as an end in itself.

It is not enough, therefore, that action should accord with duty, it must be done for 'the sake of duty'. Otherwise the accordance is merely contingent and spurious because, though the unmoral ground may indeed now and then produce lawful actions, more often it brings forth unlawful ones (GMM 1991:63ff).

For Hegel, Kant’s pure motive of duty can never produce the good since it is abstracted from everything that comprises a real life, from the desires, interests, and needs of individuals in their social existence. For Hegel, the good needs to be made an integral part of everyday life in connection with the empirical desires and self-satisfaction of individuals. Hegel's conception follows Aristotle's conception of a virtue as an intelligent disposition to behave in certain ways and act for certain reasons, to feel pleasure or pain at certain things (PR para 150R; Aristotle NE 1065al2 1106bl5-30). Hegel considers Aristotelian virtue to transcend Kant's dualism of duty and inclination. 





Whereas for Aristotle reason had to persuade desire as to what it should want, for Kant, a truly moral act is performed out of respect for the moral law, without regard to inclinations. For Kant, reason is immanent in the mind of the autonomous moral agent and is unrelated to external objects. The problem is that if reason is noumenally structured, the empirical realm is left free from moral significance. Whereas Aristotle is able to establish individual self-realisation within the polis as the essential field of human interaction, Kant's approach assumes a set of rational ideas inherent in the human mind from which the state as the prime political object derives. In the Aristotelian conception, reason persuades the empirical world from within, in the Kantian conception, reason teaches the world from without. Hegel thus charges Kantian ethics with being an 'empty formalism' which is incapable of generating an 'immanent doctrine of duties' (PR para 135R) within the social world. Kant's pure motive of duty becomes a 'preaching' of 'duty for duty's sake' providing no content or direction of action (PR para 135R). Immanence is the key question – is Kant’s reason active in the empirical world or outside of it?

I would argue that Hegel's criticism is valid only if attention remains fixed upon the Formula of Universal Law, focusing upon the categorical imperative's universality in terms of its form. Whilst Kant's morality is indeed formal, it is not empty in the sense of sheer consistency and non-contradiction. Kant is not indifferent to ends. Kant's standard of universalisation is tied to the ethic of ends which imposes the duty upon each to treat all others with the respect they expect to receive in return. This ethic has practical implications, ruling out institutions and practices which treat human beings as means to external ends and leading to the 'realm of ends' composed of free and equal members, a moral community composed of autonomous, self-legislating agents. The imperative to treat humanity as an end and never as a means therefore puts some 'nonheteronomous teleological flesh' upon 'the bare bones of universality' (Riley 1982:49).

But is Kant’s reason immanent in both materialist and social senses?
Set alongside Aristotelian notions of the richly endowed happy individual, the Kantian self may appear to be deracinated, as 'thin as a needle' (Murdoch 1985:53). However, it is simply not true to argue that the Kantian self lacks moral, social and affective ties to others and is subjected to the empty ethic of duty for duty's sake. Kant does possess an intersubjective dimension. For Kant, the capacity to universalise the principles of actions is a necessary but not sufficient condition of the morality of these actions. Principles are only moral when tied to objective ends, specifically the injunction to treat human beings as ends rather than means. The conception of rational agency in the universal Formula is thin when considered in itself, which is why Kant connected it to an ethic of objective ends and a moral community. Without this teleology, Kant states, morality would be 'destroyed'. The abandonment of morally necessary ends 'would do away with all moral philosophy'. (DV 1964 43, Ak. 384).

Further, Kant was just as interested as Aristotle in developing the right kind of moral personality. The difference is that whereas Aristotle’s good character possesses an aristocratic character, in the meritocratic sense of ‘the best’, aristé, Kant's good character possesses a democratic character in being open to anyone, regardless of gifts of intelligence, beauty, wealth or good luck. Kant realises that universal principle alone, at a formal level, cannot ensure morality and therefore ties it to an ethic of ends which treats all individuals as beings endowed with dignity by virtue of their humanity, their capacity for moral action, not just by virtue of their talent and skill and expertise. Kant's ethic taught respect for the rational moral element in each individual and is 'built to preserve its own self-respect and that of others, neither demanding nor enduring servility' (Shklar 1984:233).

Kant departs from the classical conception of happiness as an intrinsic component of the highest good. Kant recognises the extent to which the modern principle of subjectivity has subverted the overarching ethical framework of the good, severing the necessary connection between individual happiness and the universal good in the classical conception. In consequence, the good has been subjectivised in the modern world, becoming the product of individual desire and preference, in opposition to the individual good of others and the common good of all. In addressing this new context, Kant demotes happiness from being the first principle of practical philosophy: 'it is the moral disposition which conditions and makes possible the participation in happiness, and not conversely the prospect of happiness that makes possible the moral disposition' (CPuR 1965 B.841). Happiness and the good are no longer directly connected and therefore require the mediation of moral virtue. The rational value of happiness - the 'complete good' - now depends upon the possession of moral virtue and is made the condition of the worthiness to be happy through moral conduct or goodwill (GMM 1991:59; CPuR 1965 3; G37-38 B.341).

In the first instance, Kant identifies happiness with the well being of a finite rational being (GMM 1959:61), its total and lasting advantage through the satisfaction of natural desires or inclinations. Kant goes further in arguing that happiness is an 'idea' in which 'all inclinations are combined into a sum total’ (GMM 1991:64), an 'absolute whole or maximum of well-being' (GMM 1959:35). 'Happiness is the satisfaction of all our desires' (CPuR 1965: B.834). Kant subordinates the hedonistic view that objects of desire are willed for the pleasure they may bring (CPrR 1956:20) to 'contentment in fulfilling a purpose .. determined by reason alone’, acknowledging the 'highest practical function' of reason to be the establishment of a good will (GMM 1991:62). 'Happiness, therefore, in exact proportion with the morality of the rational beings who are thereby rendered worthy of it, alone constitutes the supreme good of that world wherein, in accordance with the command of a pure but practical reason, we are under obligation to place ourselves' (CPuR 1965 B.342).

Kant proceeds to develop a concept of happiness as the harmony of ends. The reality of this systematic unity of ends occurs in the intelligible - hence moral - world rather than in the sensible world (CPuR 1965 B.842). This 'leads inevitably also to the purposive unity of all things, which constitute this great whole, in accordance with universal laws of nature (just as the former unity is in accordance with universal and necessary laws of morality), and thus unites the practical with the speculative reason' (CPuR 1965 B.843). The world must be in harmony with that moral employment of reason founded on the idea of the supreme good (1955 B.844).
Happiness, as free and rational activity, is more than self-preservation, instinctual gratification, and pleasure, but consists of knowledge, insight and creativity (Van Der Linden 1985:70/1). The actions of a being having will must be determined by reason rather than instinct (GMM 1991:60/111). To this end, natural inclinations are to be 'tamed': 'instead of clashing with one another they can be brought into a harmony in a wholeness which is called happiness' (R 1960:51). Happiness is the unification of 'all the ends which are prescribed by our desires' (CPuR 1965:632).

The basis of the conflict between Kant and Hegel lies in their different conceptions of objective ends. Hegel's more Aristotelian teleology makes the ends of moral action a condition in the world, making actions instrumental to some good yet to be achieved. For Kant, this denies the moral status of action since the end is not extrinsic to action but is part of the 'rational nature’ of human beings, as ends capable of shaping and pursuing ends (DV 1971:45/6 51). Whereas Kant considered the moral will to be part of the 'rational nature' of human beings, hence prior to actions, Hegel made it part of historical development, attached to  commitments in the objective world of political and legal institutions (PR para 75A).

This does not mean that Kant lacks an ideal to be achieved, far from it. Kant offers an ideal aiming to emancipate individuals from the phenomenal world of causal laws. His moral law, as self-legislated, asserts the rationality, freedom and equality of all and is applicable to each and all as noumenal persons. In contradistinction to legislation in the actual world, members always heed moral legislation in the realm of ends. Since each member is both legislator and the subject of the laws, giving the moral law and obeying it, all are equal.
The realm of ends thus envisages an ideal human community composed of free and equal members (CPuR 1965: B.372); it is a goal of future society, a concept of future life (CPuR 1965: B.836f). The realm of ends is a vision of a possible world in which all individuals really are the pure moral agents following the moral law which reason asserts they ought to be (GMM 1991:95/6). 







As an ideal, the realm of ends exists as a criterion by which to critically evaluate the existing political order. This has radical, practical and future oriented possibilities as an ideal civil constitution in which coercion has been replaced by moral reason. 

Discussing Plato's idea of the perfect city, Kant envisages:





For Kant, this constitution is ‘a necessary idea which must be made the basis not only of the first outline of a political constitution but of all laws as well.’ 
Kant envisages the progressive replacement of coercion by reason: ‘The more closely the legislation and government were made to harmonise with this idea, the rarer punishments would become, and it is thus quite rational to maintain (as Plato does) that none would be necessary at all in a perfect state.’ 
For the radical implications of this ideal civic constitution, one need only compare the above passage with Marx’s conception of communism as an ‘association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all’. (Marx MCP Rev1848 1973:87/8).

In repudiating the pessimistic thesis that imperfect political institutions are the product of corrupt human nature, Kant affirms the human potentiality for improvement towards the good and is therefore able to conceive of a future state of human flourishing. With his emphasis on cognitive and moral human agency in shaping the world, Kant is able to locate the cause of imperfection not in corrupt human nature but in 'the neglect of the pure ideas in the making of the laws' (CPuR 1965:312). Kant thus explains corrupt human nature by imperfect institutions and argues that these ought, therefore, to be transformed and placed on a moral basis to enable human beings to flourish as moral beings.

This entails that the perfect constitution be realised as part of the duty to realise the highest good. Kant describes this ideal constitution as 'a necessary idea which must be taken as fundamental not only in first projecting a constitution but in all its laws'. The 'the rightfulness of the Idea’ brings ‘the legal organisation of mankind ever nearer to its greatest possible perfection, advances this maximum as an archetype' (CPuR 1965 B.373-374).
Even if the perfect state should never come about, the idea still remains correct. ‘For no-one can or ought to decide what the highest degree may be at which mankind may have to stop progressing, and hence how wide a gap may still of necessity remain between the idea and its execution. For this will depend on freedom, which can transcend any limit we care to impose.’

Happiness deriving from the moral perfection of humanity does not imply an unmediated existence beyond institutions, proceeding through 'inner' conviction alone. Instead, happiness is situated within the collective framework of a perfect civil constitution and its laws. Kant's 'concept of freedom' is the essential core of Kant's ethics in that it establishes the possibility of the categorical imperative, the 'keystone of the whole edifice of pure reason' (CPuR 1965 B.7 394n; CPrR 1956:3).
The implications are radical, with clear practical import with respect to the way that human beings live their lives. From the perspective of the ideal, those political and social institutions which deny the lawmaking autonomy of individuals are subject to criticism and practical transformation. The norm in contemporary society is heteronomy, determination by external laws, whether one’s natural inclinations or the arbitrary will of others. This means that Kant’s ideal of autonomy, being governed rationally by self-legislated laws, remains a goal still to be achieved and, as such, a goal for practical human willing in politics (Van Der Linden 1985:32). It is one small step from Kant’s ethic of ends to Marx's critique of the heteronomous character of capitalist society with a view to realising the autonomous moral community. Within the capital system, the ends of some are preferred or downgraded whilst those of others are ignored or denied. Marx's conception of communism as 'an association of free men, working with the means of production held in common, and expending their many different forms of labour-power in full self-awareness as one single social labour force' (Marx C1 1976:171) is in a direct line of descent from Kant’s ideal constitution as promising a self-regulating society. Marx's cooperative mode of production can thus be presented in terms of Kantian morality as a community of colegislators determining collective affairs democratically within autonomy-enhancing conditions (Van Der Linden 1988:250). Marx develops the Kantian values of autonomy and of the human being as an end-in-itself as a critique of capitalist relations for reducing individuals to mere means to external ends. The cooperative mode of production and commune system of government which Marx proposes envisages individuals as colegislators in their social and political institutions and thus realises the categorical imperative as an ethic of content. This is a vision of the self-mediation of freely associated labour developing a consciously controlled form of mediation against capitalistically alienated forms (Meszaros 1995:17; Meszaros 1970:78/9 92 248/9 285). 'The veil is not removed from the countenance of the social life-processes, i.e. the process of material production, until it becomes production by freely associated men, and stands under their conscious and planned control' (C1 1976:173).

Although, Kant’s concept of the republic of ends is able to critically expose the failings of actual society, what is needed is an account of how this society can be brought into accordance with the ideal. Kant states that his ideal constitution has been formulated in abstraction from certain 'hindrances' (CPuR 1965 B.374), implying a gap between the realm of ends and the empirical world that has to be bridged by the moral praxis of human agents. The second Critique makes it clear that Kant is referring here to two things:

1.	sensory nature, which is external to the individual, so that even the legislation of reason, the determination of human will by the moral law, may not alter its course (CPrR 1956:15 21). 
2.	internal nature, the inclinations individuals possess through natural causality, which divert human beings from the moral law (CPrR 1956:20ff).

Knowledge of the course of nature and of the moral law are crucial in overcoming these hindrances. 

The resolution of the problem depends upon the way that the relation between reason and nature is conceived. We need a material account of Kant’s ideal. 

Marx dismissed Kant's highest good as the province of religious hope rather than practical politics: 





For Marx, Kant's highest good exists only as an abstract heavenly ideal, like Plato’s World of Being. However, Marx’s criticism applies only if Kant’s ideal is denuded of its content. Kant's highest good is an empty ideal or religious hope only to the extent that it is not grounded in the categorical imperative as a social ethics and moral praxis (Van Der Linden 1985:78/9). The categorical imperative demands that individuals seek the moral kingdom in which each enhances the ends of all. All obey the moral law and cooperate in the promotion of universal happiness. Kant's moral law projects an abstract and 'empty' ideal only by detaching the desirable end from the moral community of co-legislators who, in seeking to enhance each another's ends, form the content of that community. Kant's highest good rests upon 'a moral kingdom of purposes., viz., the existence of rational beings under moral laws' (CJ 1951:295). The fact that interaction within the moral community is rendered meaningful due to the actual purposiveness and inclinations of individuals within the empirical world makes it possible to conceive reason as truly interactive, situated and social.
Marx himself is vulnerable to a number of criticisms on this point. Marx has not only underestimated the power of morality and culture in realising the moral community embodying the highest good, his emphasis upon the particular class that possesses structural power and social futurity has an exclusive character which contrasts with the inclusiveness of Kant’s perspective which invites the participation of all human beings as rational beings. Marx also underestimates the extent to which the transcendental perspective can inspire human beings to constantly raise their sights beyond the temporal or empirical realm and act in order to achieve a world that is better than the one that is immediately given. Some such notion may well be implicit in Marx’s revolutionary-critical praxis. ‘Workers of all lands unite’, Marx urged. If material interest were enough, there would be no need to issue this moral and political proclamation. The presentation of an ideal that transcends the given in time and place, inspiring hope and motivating action, is explicit in and central to Kant’s moral praxis. The creative power that is assigned to ideals, morality and culture is a strength that Kantian transcendental idealism has over perspectives which narrow praxis down to things, tools, instruments, and interests.

Marx does, however, identify the crucial question as being how to relate the ‘good will’ in the ideal noumenal realm to the needs and impulses of individuals in the empirical world. The task that the ideal of the realm of ends sets for each individual, as a member of a group of rational beings, is to transform and constitute society according to the moral law. This is the ideal of the 'moral world', the world as it 'ought to be', as revealed by the 'necessary laws of morality' (B.836). This is 'so .. far thought .. as a mere idea' since an account of its conditions in the sensible world of experience is lacking. Nevertheless, it is at the same time 'a practical idea, which really can have, as it also ought to have, an influence upon the sensible world, to bring that world, so far as may be possible, into conformity with the idea' (CPuR 1965 B.836). The idea of a moral world, therefore, has 'objective reality', not as referring to an object of an intelligible intuition 'but as referring to the sensible world, viewed, however, as being an object of pure reason in its practical employment' (B.836). This achieves the idea of a 'corpus mysticum of rational beings' 'so far as the free will of each being is, under moral laws, in complete systematic unity with itself and with the freedom of every other' (B.836). The ethical state is thus based on the moral law and the moral purpose that that law engenders. This association uniting rational individuals would be possible if pure morality was expanded so that it were freely accepted by all. 


Peace And Freedom Under Law

The principal aim of Kant's political philosophy is to establish 'the way to peace', converting class, difference and diversity into order, identity and unity (Saner 1973:3 4). With the realisation of the republican constitution within each nation, the dream of 'perpetual peace' becomes a realistic possibility (PP 1991:99/100 114).

Kant argues that 'the sovereignty of the good principle is attainable, as far as men can work toward it, only through the establishment and spread of a society in accordance with and for the sake of the laws of virtue, a society whose task and duty it is rationally to impress these laws in all their scope upon the entire human race' (R 1949:404). It follows from this that 'the species of rational beings is objectively, through the idea of reason, destined for a social goal, namely, the promotion of the highest good as a social good' (1949:407).

The central problem in Kant's politics is to discover the principles upon which unity is founded so as to ensure the greatest possible freedom of each and all (Saner 1973:215). Government under law transforms the license in which the freedom of each individual cancels itself out in the mutual conflict of all individuals into a freedom of each coexisting with the freedom of all. This image of rational freedom as a lawful freedom which is achieved through legal process pervades the Critique of Pure Reason and is central to Kant's 'architectonic' (CPuR 1965 B.860).

In his political writings, Kant delineates the practical and institutional requirements which ensure the realisation of the good in the social world. Kant identifies the perfect constitution as the republican state, which realises the social as against unsocial character of human beings through the rule of law, and which guarantees the greatest possible freedom for each individual which is consistent with all individuals. The role of government lies in placing a barrier against the outbreak of unlawful inclinations so as to facilitate the development of the moral disposition to a direct respect for the law. In assuring each individual that all individuals will follow the concept of law, government represents a 'great step' 'towards morality ..towards a state where the concept of duty is recognised for its own sake, irrespective of any possible gain in return’ (PP Reiss 1991:121n). Here, in politics, is the incarnation of Kant’s view that true morality is built on a duty that is emphatically distinguished from interest, gain, from class or sectional implication.

By guaranteeing equal external freedom for each individual, the rule of law fosters a climate favourable to moral autonomy and is therefore preparatory for the final end of creation, the moral community in which the command of law is internalised as the product of moral motives rather than of self-interest and coercion, gain and power. Internal discipline replaces external discipline. At this stage, political peace is freely and spontaneously affirmed by human agents as morally autonomous beings. In this community, agents do not merely leave each other free to pursue private ends but come actively to promote each other's ends (Van Der Linden 1985:188).

Kant thus shows how individuals can form themselves into a collectively universal will. This will is a collective force for the regulation of supra-individual forces, forming public law under a sovereign authority (Reiss 1991:26). This is an expansion rather than an infringement of individual liberty since individuals obey only that law to which they have agreed (Reiss 1991:11). Kant's conception of the moral life is based upon the capacity of individuals to universalise and hence give their moral principles the force of law. Freedom and lawfulness, far from being antithetical as in an individualist liberal conception of liberty, are integral to each other. Freedom is not the absence of necessity but the moral recognition of necessity in the shape of relationships of obligation with others. Since human beings do not just obey law but make it, necessity is put on a moral basis.
In the absence of this legal process, reason remains in the state of nature and asserts its claims only through war, with disputes ending not in a lasting peace but only in a temporary armistice. In contrast, a legal order ensures an eternal peace through the recognised methods of legal action. This legal order limits individual freedom in such a way as to render it consistent with the freedom of all and hence with the common good of all (CPuR 1965 B.779/80). Kant unites the freedom of each individual and all individuals through the reciprocity of legal obligations. All individuals are equal before and subject to the one universal law. The rules of the lawful state are reciprocal in being equally and mutually obligatory for all individuals (Saner 1973:30/1).

In the Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View (1784), Kant seeks to ground hope for moral progress in the historical process, seeking to inspire moral action to bring about the realisation of progressive political ends, the perfect state and peace. The greatest problem that nature assigns to the human race is to design a just civic constitution. This civic constitution establishes a commonwealth in which the destructive passions of natural freedom are tamed for the good by civic union. The development of human capacities to the full requires the creation of a social order with the greatest possible freedom.

In the Idea, human culture evolves out of the chaotic state of nature. From within the chaotic appearance of the human world, Kant discerns a slow but steady evolution of culture (KGS 8:17).

It is the purpose of Nature that human natural capacities be fully developed, not in any individual alone but in the human race as a whole. It is Nature’s intention that human beings use their natural capacities to work out their independent way of securing human well-being. The cunning of nature suffices for this task, operating through mechanisms of self-interest to compel human beings to institute 'a law-governed social order' (UH 1991:44). 

Kant endows the individual with an 'unsocial sociability' in which drives towards associationalism - the inclination to 'live in society' - and individualisation - the tendency to 'live as an individual' - conflict (UH 1991:44). The political problem is to recognise and reconcile the legitimate claims of both facts. 'Unsocial sociability’ compels human beings to prepare for the replacement of a natural order characterised by conflicting particular wills by a legal order embodying the universal will: 'a beginning is made towards establishing a way of thinking which can with time transform the primitive natural capacity for moral discrimination into definite practical principles' (UH 1991:44/5). Identifying 'the development of all natural capacities' as the 'highest purpose of nature’, Kant predicates human growth and development upon the interplay of the natural inclinations of asociability and the moral inclinations of sociability (UH 1991:45). Out of this clash of antagonistic forces, the individual seeks a form of association which has 'the greatest freedom' within specific limits so that 'it can coexist with the freedom of others' (UH 1991:45).

The social order which enables the greatest possible freedom is a perfectly just constitution in which mutual opposition between its members is made consistent with freedom and justice. 

However, this commonwealth of individuals can only be achieved if peace and harmony among all the nations is secured. For the same antagonism that sets individuals against each other in society also establishes hostile relations between the nations. The ultimate purpose of Nature is therefore to lead humankind from the state of individual rivalry to the state of social harmony, and from the state of national rivalry to the state of international harmony. Peace and harmony reigns between individuals in society and between sovereign states in the international domain. 

The development of the pragmatic capacity for social control involves a high human cost in the short term but nevertheless makes it possible in the long term to replace discord with concord, culminating in a 'civil society which can administer justice universally' (UH 1991:45). To guarantee 'freedom under external laws' requires an 'irresistible force' since members of this 'perfectly just civil constitution' are related to each other in antagonistic fashion (UH 1991:46).

Kant expands on this theme in Perpetual Peace (1795). Here he argues that Nature has used the device of war for the evolution of humankind towards peace. The state of nature is a state of war. Humankind begins in this condition and scatters itself to the ends of the Earth by ceaseless war. In time, this war produces the legal order on three levels: civil law, the law of nations, and the law of world citizenship (KGS 8:365). These legal orders are the work of Nature. By placing different groups of people close to each other in antagonistic relations, Nature compels them to form states for their defence, to submit to public laws, to create political order. The political order which is most fitting for the rights of individuals is the republican constitution. The creation of this republican constitution as a universal power overcoming selfish inclinations 'is both the most difficult and the last to be solved by the human race' (UH 1991:46). Whilst many claim that only a ‘race of angels’ is capable of constituting a republic, Nature makes it possible for humankind to organize the state so that the selfish inclinations of a ‘race of devils’ are contained by their mutual opposition (KGS 8:366). 

An unconscious natural teleology is at work in this. Human beings, as children of Nature, are born with the natural instinct for selfishness, and this leads them into the state of war. However, this war drives human beings to develop the intelligence that Nature has also endowed them with. Eventually, human beings become sufficiently intelligent to leave the state of war by building a civil society which enables the orderly exercise of individual freedom, thus creating the foundation for the flowering of culture. However, a civil peace and freedom that is established within  the confines of a single state is vulnerable to the predation of competing states in a condition of international war. Therefore, according to Kant’s natural teleology, humankind will come to extend the peaceful union of warring individuals in the social sphere to a peaceful union of warring states in the international sphere. This development is initiated by Nature and proceeds according to the progressive unfolding of Nature’s endowment. Human history is therefore the work of Nature. Humankind is a product of nature, and is endowed with the power to realize the highest good.

The republican or civil constitution acknowledges freedom as a collective project which connects the individual with essential universal powers and potentialities beyond an immediate, individual, direct response to circumstances. Kant proceeds from Rousseau’s distinction between liberty and license. For Kant, although the individual, as a rational being, 'desires a law to impose limits on the freedom of all', 'he is still misled by his self-seeking animal inclinations into exempting himself from the law where he can' and thus 'abuses his freedom in relation to others'. The individual therefore 'requires a master to break his self will and force him to obey a universally valid will under which everyone can be free'. But since this 'master' can be found only the human species, and hence 'will also be an animal who needs a master' (UH 1991:46), the realisation of the perfect constitution will be the last problem to be solved. 

This is the old paradox of emancipation, the corruption of circumstances involving a corruption of human nature, forcing recourse to a liberatory philosopher-ruler from the outside. The solution to this problem requires 'a correct conception of the nature of a possible constitution, great experience tested in many affairs of the world, and above all else a good will prepared to accept the findings of this experience’ (UH Reiss 1991:47). This case for praxis makes it clear that Kant's 'master' is not an external agency but the rational nature that is planted within human beings themselves. Mastery is therefore a self-mastery which individuals achieve through obedience to the moral law, becoming, in politics, autonomous citizens living under the perfect constitution obeying laws that are self-made and self-imposed.

That this greater liberty of 'rational freedom' is achieved through an inner mastery and not just through an institutional constraint is suggested by Kant's reference to the realisation in the historical process of a 'hidden plan of nature to bring about an internally - and for this purpose also externally - perfect political constitution as the only possible state within which all natural capacities of mankind can be developed completely' (UH 1991:50). To this end, nature guides human inclinations over time to the rational end of a 'just civil constitution' as the final condition for the self-development of the natural faculties of human beings (UH 1991:45). 
Kant, having separated the individual and the species, with reason capable of being fully realised only in the latter (UH 1991:42), now comes to recognise that nature is moral after all. This makes it clear that Kant’s target in the critiques is not nature as such but those inclinations and impulses which chain rational human beings to the empirical world of necessity and immediacy. Reason, too, is a natural endowment, which human beings can use to realise moral freedom as a rational natural end. In achieving this end, individuals ensure that the 'pathologically enforced social union is transformed into a moral whole' (UH 1991:44/5). The pathologically enforced coordination of society is superseded by an internal moral coordination through the process of culture.

Kant emphasises the role of the philosopher in this cognitive and moral praxis. In bringing the hidden plan of nature to light, the philosopher grounds the hope of progress in the perfect state and peace, thus stimulating amongst individuals the moral action which is required to realise these ends. The role of the philosopher is to 'formulate in terms of a definite plan of nature a history of creatures who act without a plan of their own' (UH 1991:42). In other words, reason inspires the moral impulse in individual agents and informs their practice as they act to bring about the perfect constitution and perpetual peace. This hope is not Utopian since it is grounded in Nature as she pushes humanity towards the good; through the plan of nature, philosophy can have its belief in a millennium (UH 1991:50). The intelligent moral praxis of human beings thus hastens the fulfilment of natural human ends on earth (UH 1991:52/3). Thus, a philosophical attempt to work out a universal history of the world in accordance with a plan of nature which is aimed at a perfect civic union of mankind, must be regarded as possible, and even as capable of furthering the purpose of nature itself (UH 1991:51).




For Kant, the philosophical problem of politics is how to convert lawless conflict into a moral ideal of peace (Saner 1973:310 313). The struggle for the rule of law persists until the realisation of the ideal of the republican state ensuring the greatest possible freedom for all. The chaos that conflict between the freedom of the individual and all others produces can be avoided only with the constitution of a lawful framework regulating individuals in a universally binding manner. This ensures that the free actions of one individual 'can be reconciled with the freedom of the other in accordance with a universal law', individuals remaining free to pursue private ends within the constraint of external freedom as defined by the 'Universal Principle of Right': 'Every action which by itself or by its maxim enables the freedom of each individual's will to coexist with the freedom of everyone else in accordance with a universal law is right' (GMM 1991:133).

This is an application of Kant's universal principle of morality to politics. In Perpetual Peace, Kant argues that political  philosophy  must  begin  from  the a priori awareness of the moral law as opposed to principles of (empirical) advantage, which would  issue  in  the rationalisation of unjust acts (PP 1991:93ff). The 'First Definitive Article'  restates  two  formulations  of  the Categorical Imperative to produce an a priori starting point. The 'objective' formulation, that human beings act in accordance with practical laws valid for all, is given political form in the principle that all members of society are equally subject to a 'common legislation' (PP 1991:99). The 'subjective' formulation, that human beings treat each other as ends and never as means, respecting everyone's capacity to legislate for themselves, takes political form in the principle of the 'freedom of all members of a society' (PP Reiss 1991:99). These principles lead to the idea of the moral agent as 'citizen of a transcendental world' (PP 1991:99), employing the moral law to establish a possible 'republican' constitution in the empirical world, structuring a 'civil society'. In this context, the realm of ends is a 'respublica noumenon' (CF 1991:187), appropriate to a 'race of angels' (PP 1991:112); civil society 'is a 'respublica phenomenon' which applies not to a moral idea of human beings but to a world of experience, to, in the worst possible case, a 'nation of devils' (PP 1991:112).
In so far as individuals live in two spheres (the intelligible and the natural), they are torn between freedom under the moral law and the ethical arbitrariness of natural inclinations. Insofar as this bifurcation of the two spheres holds, the principle of society and its laws cannot be freedom, since freedom can never be empirically realised, but coercion, legality forcing individuals prudentially to do what they ought to do morally (PP 1991:112/3 117). Coercion is inherent in the constitutional framework of civil society, insofar as nature compels individuals to enter into a social contract in order to satisfy their inclination and protect their persons (PP 1991:97n 98n 99n). This coercive legality is necessary since individuals are inclined to pursue individual advantage at the expense of the moral law. However, this necessity of coercion  to  subordinate  natural inclinations to legally instituted motives, voiding them (PP 1991:108/114 120/ln), diverges markedly from the ideal community promised by the realm of ends and the civil constitution. Freedom as the capacity to legislate for oneself remains a predicate of the individual as noumenon. The key is to emphasise the extent to which natural teleology is both realised and supplemented by a moral praxis organised according to an autonomous human commitment to the realisation of the highest good.

Kant's 'rational freedom' is a lawful freedom that restrains individual appetite and inclination in order to reach the higher good for all. In this conception, 'right is the restriction of each individual's freedom so that it harmonizes with the freedom of everyone else' and law is the general coercive rule which achieves this general union (TP 1991:73). Kant's thought compares and contrasts with Rousseau, particularly the principle of self-assumed obligation and the idea of law as an educative process that forces people to be free. Though what Kant calls 'lawful freedom' is based on the right of the individual 'to obey no law other than that to which he has given his consent' (GMM 1991:139), this 'state of lawful dependence' created by the legislative will of its members does not imply democracy. Individuals must demonstrate a 'fitness to vote’ by being an independent and active member of the commonwealth (GMM 1991:139). Since all 'are not equally qualified within this constitution to possess the right to vote', not all 'have a right to influence or organise the state itself as active members, or to co-operate in introducing particular laws' (GMM 1991:140). In insisting that positive laws not be at variance with the natural laws of freedom, Kant does at least allow the equality of all 'to work their way up from their passive condition to an active one' (GMM 1991:140). This would equip the individual to influence and organise the state as an active member. 

The notion of ‘fitness to vote’ is of a piece with Kant’s attempt to transcend natural inclinations for the highest good. Those who are unfitted to vote are those who are in a condition of material dependence and would therefore tend to vote according to self-interest as given within the necessity of the empirical world. The votes of individuals pursuing their own interests and desires would reflect a passive condition of material dependency, not an active consideration of moral good in the commonwealth. The translation of the popular will into public policy would therefore reflect not a rational and moral will concerned with the common good of all but a congeries of individual inclinations, interests and desires.

Kant refers to his ideal of a self-legislating sovereign people in the respublica noumenon as a 'Platonic ideal', existing as an 'eternal norm’ but for which there is no object adequately existent in experience (CF 1991:187). He offers the 'republican constitution' as the only means by which the respublica noumenon could be applied, according to the laws of freedom through an example in experience (respublica phenomenon) (CF 1991:187). The 'republican constitution' represents Kant's attempt to combine the ideal of the self-legislating sovereign people with the existent sovereign ruler. In the end, Kant argues for a superior authority 'to rule autocratically' so as to control individual passions and improve the ethical disposition of humanity (CF 1991:184 187). Kant's political order is, therefore, a 'coercive order’ (Ladd 1965:xviii) in which legality is 'the decisive principle' (Reiss in Reiss ed 1991:21/22). For Kant, justice as universal can only be realised through a legal coercion exercised according to universal principle. 

Kant's morality of duty, institutionalised as a 'lawful freedom', does not provide a solution to the problem of order. Rather, in conceding the phenomenal world of natural inclination to self-interest, Kant's ethics degenerate into a formalistic morality which is designed not to overcome self-interest but constrain it within the capitalist structures of private property and the minimal state.

To the extent that we remain within a legal constraint of individual inclinations and impulses, rather than attain a moral order that transcends empirical necessity, then we fall short of the complete rational freedom which is promised by the highest good. Thus, whilst Kant’s philosophy and ethics possesses a strong democratic character, there is a strain in Kant's political thought which is sceptical of democracy. Kant restricts the right to vote to individuals who qualify as active citizens, self-employed males i.e. the individual who is 'his own master' through owning 'same sort of property .. that supports him' (Saw 1974:63/4; CJ 1951:79). There is no contradiction here. Moral autonomy and active citizenship are key components of the democratisation Kant envisages in his ethics and philosophy and would follow the attainment of the highest good. A legal order which falls short of the moral order has yet to attain full democratisation in this respect. To put the point from the other direction, those subject to determination in terms of external appetite, inclination, interest etc. are incapable of exercising an independent moral choice and therefore cannot be trusted to vote freely as active, informed citizens thinking of the common good.
The argument has radical implications which Kant did not pursue. For Kant, the labourer cannot have the right to participate on account of being dependent on another's will through not owning the instruments and products of labour (CJ 1951:79). Kant’s argument that all human beings possess reason implies that all should participate in a universal moral and political realm, an inclusive claim that applies to labourers. The challenge is to create those social conditions that enables all individuals to transcend any external determination to which they are subject and thus come to participate in a universal order as rational beings. If the labourer is to acquire the attribute of citizenship fitting to a rational being, it follows that the economic structure of society must be transformed so as to abolish social dependence. Kant, however, himself limits his comments here to the possibility that the passive citizen may rise to become an active citizen through 'talent, industry and luck’ (Saw 1974:60). 

Kant also repudiates the directly democratic implications of the social contract in favour of a republican state in which popular sovereignty is exercised through representatives chosen in free elections (Saw 1974:64). Yet, as Marx's critique of abstract political representation would come to show, representatives of the people are not independent of particular interests and do not necessarily legislate in the universal interest, even though legislative activity proceeds within a constitutional framework that embodies the universal principle. Kant's republican ideal could not serve the universal interest without an actively democratic input, an active as well as a passive suffrage, a commission or a recall system uniting electors and deputies. The problem is that very few, if anyone, can meet Kant’s requirements for active citizenship in a capital economy which is subject to systemic imperatives and impersonal dynamics. What Marx's critique would show most of all is the impossibility of a public realm under capitalism. Capitalism is not a public domain but a regime of private accumulation. Capitalism privatises and depoliticises the public realm by making common affairs the province of the private realm (Levine 1984:133/4). The realisation of the political ideal of Kant's republican state (and this applies to Hegel's state as ethical agency) requires the abolition of the systemic determination that accompanies the capital economy, making it possible to invest the public sphere with democratic and material content, thereby ensuring that the universal interest legislated through the public sphere reflects the will of all.

The most that Kant will concede to this radical project is a formal or legal equality which 'is quite consistent with the greatest inequality' in social life. Kant accepts the corollary that whilst persons are 'equal subjects before the law', if 'the welfare of one person is greatly dependent on the will of another (the poor depending on the rich), one must obey .. when the other commands' (Saw 1974:59/60). Such dependence contradicts the principle of active citizenship and, therefore, blocks the full realisation of Kant’s republican ideal. 

Of all the 'rational' thinkers, Kant expresses most clearly the dualistic character of law as rational and law as positive (Norrie ed 1991:ch3; Wood 1990:70/1), of law as embodying the rational will of individuals and of law as controlling the egoistic will of individuals, of law as freedom and of law as coercion. Law involves both a concept of right and a concept of regulation, split between a possible freedom and an actual necessity. Hegel would come to attempt a synthesis by the rational elucidation of the universal within the particular. Law thus emerges in Hegel as a moment in the movement of the rational within the social (Norrie 1991:ch4).
As the application of principles of right to experience, Kant's principles of politics are normative. Indeed, Kant explicitly argues that politics should be normative. Right .. 'ought never to be adapted to politics, but politics ought always to be adapted to right' (Kant in Reiss ed 1991:21). Thus Kant affirms that there can be no conflict of politics, as a practical doctrine of right, with ethics, as a theoretical doctrine of right: 'all politics must bend the knee before right' (PP 1991:125).

This comes with the corollary that morality and legality must be related in such a way that morality shapes politics (PP 1991:93/130). The Categorical Imperative, universalising only those maxims of action which respect all individuals as ends in themselves, thus obtains political form. Though 'man' 'is a mere trifle' in relation to the 'inaccessible highest cause' of nature, 'it is not just a trifle but a reversal of the ultimate purpose of creation' 'if the rulers of man's own species regard him as such and treat him accordingly', 'using him as a mere instrument of their ends' (CF 1991:185). Further, if legality can be interpreted as ensuring that some moral ends (prohibition of theft, murder etc) are observed, then the political-legal realm can be conceived as the partial realisation of an ideal realm in which individuals respected each other as ends. Politics is thus the legal realisation of moral ends.




The success of Kant’s project depends upon the extent to which culture and nature can be successfully integrated through reason. And this, in turn, depends upon the extent to which reason can be located within nature rather than simply opposed to nature from the outside. Without this integration, it is not possible to establish the basis of freedom in the empirical world, insofar as it remains a world of bondage subjecting individuals to alien forms. To the extent that Kant’s ideal is locked up in a normative realm abstracted from the empirical world, the real state will be unable to proceed beyond Kant's minimal assumption of intelligent devils, an assumption which conveniently corresponds to a market society based upon antagonism and egoism in human relations (Lukacs 1991:72 73). The social facts of class division and the autonomy-denying universal antagonism of the ‘war of all against all’ within civil society means that the coercion that Kant wrote of in the 'respublica phenomenon’ is necessarily the basis of legality, against which the reconciling power of reason is impotent. Marx showed that Kant's vision of the harmonious community of noumenal beings - the 'respublica noumenon' - is a material and historical possibility only through the abolition of class and the alienating division of labour which generate coercion in human relationships (Marx OJQ EW 1975:221).
Insofar as all empirical phenomena remains outside the bounds of reason, Kant's framework is dualistic. As the product of pure reason, emancipating individuals from natural inclinations, Kant's freedom under law cannot but possess an external character which is apart from individuals in their real lives. The separation of moral society from the world of experience, treating individuals as rational beings as distinct from natural beings, (Krieger 1972:101/2), is bought at a price when it comes to political and social affairs. As Hegel argued, 'although practical reason postulates the identity of idea and reality, the latter remains strictly opposed and external to reason' (NL 1975:59/60 72). If the 'true' moral nature of human beings is identified with a self which is distinct from the empirical self, then individuals have to value the rational aspect of identity whilst denying that the natural world of needs, wants, and desires could possess any rationality. This is a severe morality. For Kant, the individual is moral only in being able to abstract from the contingent influences and determinations of the natural and social world, coming to act according to a moral law established by pure practical reason in a noumenal realm. 'Empirical principles are always unfitted to serve as a ground for moral laws. The universality with which these laws should hold for all rational beings without exception - the unconditioned practical necessity which they thus impose - falls away if their basis is taken from the special constitution of human nature or from the accidental circumstances in which it is placed (GMM 1991:103). Kant delivers an impressive list of charges to prove that personal happiness is the 'most objectionable' principle, singling out the fact that it 'bases morality on sensuous motives' as the greatest vice (GMM 1991:103).

Kant praises Plato for demonstrating that ideas originate in reason rather than in the empirical world: 'nothing is more reprehensible than to derive the laws prescribing what ought to be done from what is done, or to impose upon them the limits by which the latter is circumscribed' (CPureR 1965:313). The human being as a 'creature' can never attain such a level of moral disposition as holiness since 'he can never be wholly free from desires and inclinations which, because they rest on physical causes, do not of themselves agree with the moral law, which has an entirely different source' (CPracR 1956:86).

In the Groundwork, Kant turned morality and Nature against each other. The categorical imperative is conceived as a stern command for the triumph of morality over the forces of natural inclination. There is nothing absolutely good other than the morally good will. (GMM 1991: 394). In the Groundwork, the natural world is at best coldly indifferent and at worst cruelly hostile to the supersensible moral ideals. Material forces are governed by mechanical laws and are therefore blind and indifferent to moral values. In constituting human nature, they produce natural inclinations that have the perpetual propensity to flout moral laws. The natural world thus works to prevent human beings realizing their transcendent aspirations. The fact that human beings have such aspirations makes the human species a misfit pitted against nature. Human beings, as moral agents, are the maltreated stepchildren of a heartless Nature. The absolute value of morality thus received protection by being enclosed in the innermost sanctuary of rational beings. Kant contemplated this troubled condition of humanity in the natural world in terms of the gap between the sensible and the supersensible worlds. This was the gap that also filled Kant with awe and wonder, the starry skies above and the moral law within. It was a gap which Kant thought he had closed.

Since the possibility of morality depends upon abstraction from the empirical world, the noumenal realm beyond the phenomenal world 'is certainly only an ideal'. Individuals enter this realm only to the extent to which they abstract from their social situation. The categorical imperative can enjoin that individuals act as though they are legislating members of a 'kingdom of ends' only 'if we abstract from the personal differences between rational beings, and also from all the content of their private ends' (GMM 1991:95). 

It is difficult to understand how the moral legislation produced in this noumenal realm could apply in the phenomenal realm. Kant himself realises that by denying the situational character of the world of experience he reduces the force of his argument. A kingdom of ends could exist if the maxims which the categorical imperative prescribes for all rational beings were universally followed. The problem is that 'if a rational being were himself to follow such a maxim strictly, he cannot count on everybody else being faithful to it on this ground' (GMM 1991:100). Because a realm of ends, in which every individual acts as a rational being, cannot be guaranteed, legal force must intervene. Kant's view imposes a dualism between the independence of the individual as a rational subject and the subordination of the individual as an empirical being to an external authority (Reiss in Reiss ed 1991:20; Norman 1983:96 98). Individuals must learn to identify happiness with the subordination of their lower nature to the necessity of the moral law in order to realise their higher nature. For the workings of the Categorical Imperative enables individuals to discover 'right' and 'wrong' independently of their inclinations, impulses and desires.

Kant's morality of self-denial, instituting the obedience of the 'lower', i.e. empirical, to the 'higher', i.e.  rational  self,  is  based  upon  the  categorical distinction between reason and nature. The problem is that this division of the individual between the phenomenal natural world as a determined order of natural necessity and the noumenal world of moral freedom risks fragmenting human experience, coming to subject the individual to a ceaseless struggle between the command of duty and natural inclinations. The failure to bridge this gap between the noumenal and the phenomenal (Maclntyre 1967:197/8; Wolff 1973:ch2) results in the autonomy of law, morality and politics within liberal society (Murphy  1970; Arendt 1982). This has implications which turn against both reason and nature. As Weber's rationalisation thesis shows, the distinction between reason and nature fits a capitalist modernity in which individuals have been made instrumental to purposes and processes which are external to them (Weber 1985; Collins 1990; Marshall 1982; Lowith 1993). The 'rational' project of substituting morality for coercion in human affairs thus ends in a lawful state administering a coercive civil society which inhibits the human ontology and subjects external nature to an instrumental rationality detached from ends.

The basis of Kant’s predicament is the separation of reason from nature and the ensuing primacy of reason over nature. On Kant's premises, certain aspects of the internal nature of human beings are in external relation to the moral law. This predicament can, happily, be overcome by human beings coming to transcend their natural inclinations for their rational and moral will which is not only just as natural but, in line of descent from Plato, the better part of human nature. This is the role of moral praxis oriented towards the highest good. 

In the recent surge of interest in ‘the body’, Kant has been criticised for his heavy emphasis upon individuals freeing themselves from the sensuous human desires which are considered to be an integral part of human nature. (see Seidler 1986, 1991). This misses Kant’s crucial point that these ‘sensuous desires’ serve to shackle human beings to natural necessity within and without, chaining them to an empirical world of wants, impulses and inclinations. In Verdi’s Brindisi from La Traviata, all the guests sing of their love of ‘passionate hedonism’ with the line ‘all that is not pleasure is senseless’. The point is that the rational tradition to which Kant belongs affirms a greater freedom beyond the pleasure of the senses in terms of the fulfilment and flourishing of the whole nature of human being. Responding to appetite and desire may bring a certain pleasure or satisfaction of impulses, but it does not bring freedom. Kant’s point is that freedom will only be achieved through the realisation of the human capacity for autonomy and independence as given by rational and moral will. The capacity of the market economy to manacle individuals to necessity in their empirical existence by manipulating their ‘sensuous desires’ is one of the most striking features of the modern world. It is this shackling of human beings by their own natural inclinations that Kant sought to overcome to achieve a greater freedom according to the highest good.

But since, as biologists claim, and as Kant well understood, ‘sensuous desires’ are essential aspects of human nature, then human beings are not just rational beings but are natural beings. A more promising strategy, then, may be to acknowledge this fact and see sensuous desires as socially and historically mediated, proceeding to attempt to unite inclinations and moral reason. Hegel's success in conceiving the possibility of moralising human nature becomes in Marx a project of moralising the whole socio-relational fabric of society, thus resolving Kant's antithesis between inclinations and the moral law. We are back here to Aristotle’s reason educating desire.

Kant's Moralitat as an inner or private dimension, posed in and of itself, has to be contextualised in connection to the public world. Whereas Kant emphasised categorical duty over against human inclination, Hegel sought to bridge the gap between finite phenomenal and infinite noumenal realms so that duty was integral to the empirical lives of individuals (Dallmayr 1993:32 33).

Kant's thought, nevertheless, contains radical possibilities which serve to test the claim that Hegel’s Sittlichkeit, (and all other political and social institutions generally), embodies the 'ought-to-be' within the 'is'. Kant's motto of enlightenment - 'have the courage to use your own understanding!’ (WE 1991:54) - celebrates the emancipation of human beings from all forms of tutelage, affirming a conception of autonomy which delegitimizes all social and political institutions that are not the product of free will. Such a notion justifies liberation from all contexts or situations which are oppressive of human freedom (Yack 1986:89/133; cf Rose 1984; Lukacs 1971:108/9). This is not a repudiation of institutional mediation as such. On the contrary, Kant rejected Fichte's 'self-sufficiency and independence outside of everything' (Fichte 1982:15) and instead sought to realise freedom within the constraint of law, not against it. Kant’s morality repudiates all dehumanising, alienating and oppressive conditions and institutions as the denial of the essential humanity, and dignity of human beings. It is in this respect that Marx would later emerge as a Kantian when affirming the 'categorical imperative to overthrow all conditions in which man is a debased, enslaved, neglected and contemptible being' (Marx CHPR:I 1975:251). The challenge is to develop the precise forms of institutional mediation which is capable of embodying this ethic.

Natural Teleology And Moral Praxis

In the Appendix to the Critique of Teleological Judgement, Kant seeks to identify the ultimate purpose of nature as a whole. He finds it in the realization of the highest good as presented in his moral theory. Kant assigns human beings a special role in realising this highest good by virtue of their rationality and morality. The highest good can only be realized by human beings as rational and moral beings, which means that humankind is the ultimate purpose of nature as a whole (CJ 427). Kant therefore defines a moral praxis at the heart of nature. Whereas in the second Critique, Kant argued that the highest good could be fully realized only in the eternal world of noumena, he is now arguing, in the Appendix, that the realisation of the highest good is the ultimate purpose of nature, realised through the moral praxis of human beings as rational agents. Kant thus conceives humankind as Nature’s children developing under the guidance and protection of nature’s providence. 

According to Kant, humanity is a link like all other animals in the chain of natural desire for happiness. What makes human beings unique amongst animals is the ability and the will to set their own goals. By virtue of this ability and will, Kant reasons, human beings hold the title of ‘lord of nature’. For Kant, this implies that human beings must transcend subjection to nature's purposes, and thus come to pursue their own independent purpose. This purpose enjoins humanity to create and sustain culture above and beyond nature (CJ 431).

My argument is that Kant's view that the moral community is something that human beings ought to realise defines his philosophy as both praxis-orientated and future-oriented. Kant's primacy of pure practical reason affirms the view that the world is created by human praxis as a moral praxis (Goldmann 1971:57). Kant presents a social and a practical ethics which affirms that '(empirical) humanity, in order to express its humanity (rational/moral nature), must produce humanity (the moral order)' (Van Der Linden 1985:13).

Of particular importance is Kant's appraisal of the moral enthusiasm and the capacity for social learning and control which exist within humanity. Kant grounds the end of the perfect state and the union of all such states in perpetual peace in the progressive realisation of the rational predispositions of the human species. The 'technological predisposition' for manipulating things entails the increasing mastery of nature to satisfy human needs. The 'pragmatic predisposition' involves the increasing social, political and cultural power of human beings to organize and employ themselves so as to realize specific purposes and accustom themselves to rule-governed behaviour. The 'moral predisposition' to treat oneself and others according to 'the principle of freedom under laws' affirms that human beings come to obey juridical laws on account of autonomous motives and exhibits a concern to promote the ends of others, so long as these ends are consistent with the universal law. Progress is achieved through the moral disposition which enjoins human beings to act as moral agents and thereby fulfil their duty to promote the highest good. In the process, human beings learn to pursue just institutions in greater numbers (A 1974:183). This is learning as a change in behaviour, a realisation of ends through moral praxis and purpose.

For Kant, culture has two elements, through which the capacity to determine ends evolves in history. The ‘culture of discipline’ increases the tendency for human beings to submit to the demands of the moral law, coming to consult the voice of duty more and more. In the first Critique, Kant defined practical freedom as 'the will's independence of coercion through sensuous impulses' (A534/B562). The ‘culture of discipline’ realises this practical freedom. Kant is developing Rousseau's argument that only by subjugating natural instincts and appetites, and thereby transcending the domain of nature, do human beings become truly human. This process implies the 'ethicisation of human nature' in which duty comes to lose its compulsory character and instead comes to be guided by moral feelings such as indignation, enthusiasm, solidarity, dignity (Van Der Linden 1985:173).
Kant’s 'culture of discipline' is akin to Plato’s ‘culture of virtue’ as laid out in the Republic. Here, Plato argues that human beings become divine by transforming their beastly passions into virtues. Kant’s idea of establishing the domain of culture over the domain of nature therefore takes up Plato’s concern with the means of establishing the ideal city or state. The culture of discipline concerns the liberation of the will from the tyranny of desires and other natural chains which shackle human beings to impulses and inclinations and thus prevent them from pursuing independent goals. Freedom is not necessarily the freedom of the individual to do or to choose what he or she wants. Subject to desires, impulses and inclinations, such a freedom is a licence, an egoism, which enslaves individuals to empirical necessity and nature’s determinism.
For Kant, the ‘culture of discipline’ will enable humanity to establish their sovereignty over natural impulses and appetites and create a culture which makes it possible to institute a civil society for the liberty and equality of all citizens. This civil society takes human beings out of the state of nature, transcending the despotism of natural inclinations in which the unconstrained freedom of each individual to pursue his or her own appetites and impulses serves to destroy the freedom of all individuals. For Kant, the final purpose of creation is civil society, established by the force of reason, and coming to extend throughout and rule the whole world (CJ 435).
It follows that the ultimate purpose of nature for humanity is to develop the ‘culture of discipline’. However, this is not a case of asserting culture against nature, since the culture of discipline is the development of natural endowment enabling humanity to transcend Nature in the same manner as children reach maturity in becoming independent of their mothers. This is Kant’s natural teleology, humanity as the grown up children of Mother Nature. This conception is far removed from the view of human beings as the maltreated stepchildren of a heartless Nature as presented in the Groundwork.
The second aspect of culture is the ‘culture of skill’. The ‘culture of skill’ refers to the increasing capacity of human beings to manipulate the natural and social environment. With it comes conflict associated with material factors such as class, exploitation and division of labour (Van Der Linden 1985:137/138). Throughout history, the majority of human beings have had to submit to 'hard work' in order to produce 'the necessities of life .. for the convenience and leisure of others who work at the less necessary elements of culture, science and art' (CJ 1951:282). To overcome this situation, Kant proposes an egalitarian ethic beyond class division. For Kant, the progress of culture overcomes class conflict through the achievement of a 'civil community' which guarantees freedom and equality for all as citizens. Only in this, the perfect state, 'can the greatest development of natural capacities take place' (CJ 1951:282). Kant’s conception of praxis is developmental and highlights the potential of the increasing rational capacity of human beings to control the natural and social environment in order to overcome conflict rooted in material scarcity and end the autonomy of social mechanisms and institutions from human control.
For Kant, the purpose of the mastery of nature is culture, and the purpose of culture, in turn, is to realise the highest political good as a preparatory stage leading to the moral community. (Van Der Linden 1985:141). The external freedom guaranteed by political peace in and between perfect states creates conditions for autonomous action on the part of citizens and diminishes the forces which encourage immoral acts. 

Kant's moral praxis rests not on a religious hope but on the rational hope for progress, affirming that the future is something open, to be created by rational human agents. 





Kant, therefore, conceives history as a process of human self-creation. The very things which define human beings as rational beings - knowledge, insight, happiness, virtue - are given by nature as endowments and potentialities for human beings to actively realise and live up to (Van Der Linden 1985:102/3). Kant, therefore, affirms a strong conception of creative, moral human agency. Culture, as 'what nature can supply to prepare [the human agent] for what he must do himself in order to be a final purpose' (CJ 1951:281), prepares the way for the moral society.

Kant's highest good projects an ideal community of colegislators and demonstrates the extent to which Kant's philosophy is future oriented and rests on a moral praxis. For Kant, human beings have a duty to change the world in order to realise a moral ideal. However, the perfect constitution and perpetual peace will be attained and maintained by rational moral action rather than by physical and material force. Kant advocated caution in politics, believing it  'foolhardy'  and  even 'punishable'  to  oppose  an existing  constitution with 'political constitutions which meet the requirements of reason’ (CF 1991:188). At the same time, Kant praised the French Revolution for arousing moral enthusiasm within 'all spectators', an enthusiasm which Kant locates in 'a moral disposition within the human race' (CF 1991:182). (We should remember here that the Greek derivation of the word ‘enthusiasm’ means to be filled with God, theos – in a sense, then, God is the moral law within each and all, which each may recognise in the other). Humanity has the 'disposition and capacity' to effect social change autonomously, 'to be the cause of its own advance toward the better' (Kant 1963:142). The prospect of the evolution of a condition of natural right in the relation of the individual to the state and of individual states to each other is founded upon this moral disposition, 'the right of every people to give itself a civil constitution of the kind that it sees fit', the 'enthusiasm with which men embrace the cause of goodness'. The enthusiasm of the spectators shows that 'true enthusiasm is always directed exclusively towards the ideal, particularly towards that which is purely moral (such as the concept of right), and it cannot be coupled with selfish interests' (CF 1991:183). The enthusiasm of the spectators, rather than the specific political acts of the Revolutionaries, evinced an objective rather than a subjective concern with advancing humanity toward the highest good embodied in political institutions.
The moral enthusiasm of the spectators of the French Revolution reveals voluntary cooperation and reciprocity to be more than a philosophical dream (Van Der Linden 1985:60, 61, 64). Kant affirms the power of example and association in motivating and sustaining moral action on the part of human agents. The 'moral disposition’ within the people possesses a tendency towards the moral society and for humanity as it ought to be, stimulating action toward the realisation of this ideal. Indicating that a moral cause is operative in humanity, events like the French Revolution reveal a capacity for the better in human nature and in society, which no philosopher or politician could discern from the course of things, and which alone unites nature and freedom in accordance with the inner principles of right in humankind (Cassirer 1981:407). Kant’s conception of the innate moral disposition of human beings therefore implies a form of prefiguration. In this sense, political events, campaigns, grassroots movements and organisations reveal the contours of a possible ideal future, give hope and inspire efforts leading to its attainment.

The question of mediation is, ultimately, a question of how reflective judgement mediates between the worlds of phenomena and noumena. I want now to approach this need for mediation from the perspective of transcendental naturalism and aesthetic judgement.

In the middle of the third Critique, Kant abandons the formalist programme and propounds the revolutionary notion of immanent Ideas. The descent of transcendent Ideas from Platonic Heaven to the natural world significantly alters Kant's earlier conception of Nature. In the first Critique and in the Groundwork, Kant had conceived Nature as a chaotic world of natural inclinations and subjective impressions, Nature as a world so unruly that Kant claimed that it was the ultimate source of all radical evil in human nature (R 1960: 19). This chaotic natural world could assume a rational order only through the a priori laws that human understanding comes to impose on empirical impressions; the world of natural inclinations could only be controlled by imposing moral laws. 

The vision that Kant develops in the third Critique is more expansive than that presented in his earlier conception. Kant now comes to argue that human beings, as Nature’s children, are equipped with natural endowments that enable them to transcend their natural state and create their cultural world, thus realizing Nature’s immanent Ideas. This is Kant's transcendent naturalism.

Whilst Kant considered Newton to be the master of natural world and Rousseau the master of the moral world, he was aware that neither could bridge the vast chasm between phenomena and noumena. Kant, in his later work, comes to locate the solution for this, the key problem in his entire philosophy, in Nature. Nature is the original matrix for realizing the supersensible Ideas in the sensible world, even before the birth of humanity; the moral and political development of humanity is shaped under the auspices of Nature’s eternal providence. His earlier acceptance of the mechanistic Newtonian conception of nature had prevented Kant from grasping this cosmic truth fully in his earlier work. Acknowledging Nature as the living force resolves Kant’s ultimate philosophical problem in bridging the chasm between noumena and phenomena. Kant’s resolution of the problem of mediation involves a two-way transition: the upward transition from phenomena to noumena, which concerns the recognition of moral law; and the downward transition from noumena to phenomena, which concerns the realization of moral law.

Kant’s solution savours a great deal of Plato's conception of the natural world as presented in the Timaeus. Recognising the difficulty of realising a just society in an amoral and irrational world, Plato laid out his conception of a rational and orderly universe in the Timaeus, where the Demiurge, the spirit of the natural world (the World-Soul), creates all things in accordance with the eternal Ideas. This conception of the natural world furnishes Plato with the cosmological foundation for the ideal state in the Republic and for the city of Magnesia proposed in the Laws (Cornford 1937; Morrow 1953/4; Mueller 1989).

In this, Plato continued Socrates’ philosophical quest, the concern to define and defend philosophy as an ethos, a moral way of life concerned with human self-knowledge. Moral and political philosophy began with Socrates and the stand he took against the overweening claims to knowledge on the part of natural philosophers who studied nature without regard to human beings and human meaning. Plato continued the Socratic quest, connecting the need to transcend the amoral forces of nature with the need to overcome the immoral forces of human beings within society. In the Gorgias, Callicles, the avowed champion of amoral naturalism and immoral humanism, is confronted by Socrates’ argument that one could be virtuous even in a totally immoral world and that one's soul could never be harmed by the immoral acts of others. In the Phaedo and the Symposium, Plato finds a safe haven for the virtuous soul in the intelligible world of Ideas. In this world, the soul was safe from the immorality of the phenomenal world. The problem is, however, that the safe haven of the intelligible world could never provide a living community for moral individuals. Thus, in the Republic, Plato determined to establish the principles of the ideal state as a moral community which is capable of providing for the moral life of individuals.

Plato bequeathed the problem of mediation between Plato’s intelligible world of Ideas and the phenomenal world, which took the form of the gap between the noumenal and the phenomenal world in Kant. I want to show how Kant’s solution combines aesthetics and nature in the Idea of Beauty and in the realisation of a natural teleology.

Kant’s resolution of the problem of mediation involves a two-way transition: the upward transition from phenomena to noumena, which concerns the recognition of moral law; and the downward transition from noumena to phenomena, which concerns the realization of moral law. 
In addressing this question of how aesthetic judgement makes these two transitions, one has to recognise that Kant had two aesthetic theories, aesthetic formalism and aesthetic Platonism. In aesthetic formalism, reflective judgements are made by the subjective feeling that the free interplay of imagination and understanding provoke in the individual. Since this free interplay involves no supersensible world, there is no need for mediation. In Kant’s aesthetic Platonism, however, there is a need for mediation, since the ultimate foundation of all aesthetic judgements is the Idea of Beauty, and this Idea belongs to the noumenal world. The Idea of Beauty is transcendent and abstract and is not therefore readily applicable to the phenomenal world. This leaves a gap between phenomena and noumena. Bridging this gap requires aesthetic Ideas constructed by imagination and understanding, and which articulate the transcendent Idea of Beauty in terms of sensible imagery. This is what artistic genius and its inspiration does. In Platonic terms, this is the descent of Ideas from Heaven to the natural world (Seung 2007: 190). In Kantian terms, immanent aesthetic Ideas perform the mediation between phenomena and noumena. With natural beauty as the expression of aesthetic Ideas, this mediatory transition is made by both human beings and nature.

For Kant, natural purpose is a supersensible Idea that cannot be found in the blind mechanism of nature (CJ 377). Kant thus proposes a two-way mediation in teleological judgement. Human beings make the upward transition for recognizing the Idea in the supersensible world and the downward transition for realizing the Idea in the natural world. But this mediation is made by both human beings and natural teleology, human beings as parts of a natural teleology. On the highest level, there may be only one Idea of natural purpose. Thus, for Plato, there is only one Idea of Life (Timaeus). However, every species has its own Idea of natural purpose and is governed in accordance with it. On this level, the multiplicity of teleological Ideas corresponds to the multiplicity of aesthetic Ideas. The various particular Ideas of natural purpose are generated by the articulation and specification of the one transcendent Idea of Life. In naming the objects of natural beauty, Kant often refers to living beings such as flowers, birds, and crustaceans. This implies the conclusion that the power of life includes the power of beauty. Thus Nature conjoins the Ideas of Life and Beauty and brings them from the supersensible to the sensible world. This descent of Ideas is engineered by the technique of Nature. This is Nature working like an artist (CJ 390). Nature’s two-way mediation between phenomena and noumena proceeds thus: Nature creates living beings in the phenomenal world by bringing down the supersensible Ideas, and one species amongst those living beings has the intelligence to apprehend the noumenal world – homo sapiens. The moral and aesthetic life of human beings is a link in the creative cycle of natural teleology, which Kant in his Idea of a Universal History conceives as the Providence of Mother Nature.

Individual men and even entire nations little imagine that, while they are pursuing their own ends, each in his own way and often in opposition to others, they are unwittingly guided in their advance along a course intended by nature. They are unconsciously promoting an end which, even if they knew what it was, would scarcely arouse their interest. 

Kant UH 1996: 41

Despite the ‘apparent wisdom of individual actions here and there’, Kant believes history as a whole reveals mainly ‘folly and childish vanity, and often of childish malice and destructiveness.’ The only way for a philosopher to form a judgement of the human species, is ‘to attempt to discover a purpose in nature behind this senseless course of human events, and decide whether it is after all possible to formulate in terms of a definite plan of nature a history of creatures who act without a plan of their own.’ (UH 1996: 42).

Kant proceeds to develop this natural teleology in a number of propositions.

1.	All the natural capacities of a creature are destined sooner or later to be developed completely and in conformity with their end.
2.	In man (as the only rational creature on earth), those natural capacities which are directed towards the use of his reason are such that they could be fully developed only in the species, but not in the individual. 
3.	Nature has willed that man should produce entirely by his own initiative everything which goes beyond the mechanical ordering of his animal existence, and that he should not partake of any other happiness or perfection than that which he has procured for himself without instinct and by his own reason. 
4.	The means which nature employs to bring about the development of innate capacities is that of antagonism within society, in so far as this antagonism becomes in the long run the cause of a law-governed social order. 
5.	The greatest problem for the human species, the solution of which nature compels him to seek, is that of attaining a civil society which can administer justice universally. 
6.	This problem is both the most difficult and the last to be solved by the human race. The difficulty …. is this: if he lives among others of his own species, man is an animal who needs a master.
7.	The problem of establishing a perfect civil constitution is subordinate to the problem of a law-governed external relationship with other states, and cannot be solved unless the latter is also solved.
8.	The history of the human race as a whole can be regarded as the realisation of a hidden plan of nature to bring about an internally—and for this purpose also externally—perfect political constitution as the only possible state within which all natural capacities of mankind can be developed completely.




Kant’s natural teleology brings about, internally and externally, the perfect political constitution which fully realises all natural capacities of humankind. I would read this natural teleology in light of Kant’s two way transition between phenomenal and noumenal worlds. 

Kant reaffirms the Platonic conception of the rational order of Nature in his Ideological conception of natural order. Kant therefore continues Plato's quest for a suitable natural order for the realization of eternal ideals. The descent of transcendent Ideas from the Platonic world of Being releases Nature from the shackles of humanly imposed moral and natural laws since Nature is able to operate with the power of its own immanent Ideas. In this quest, Kant’s natural teleology revitalises the Platonic conception of Nature as the Mother of all Creation, opening up a conception of Mother Nature as the Eternal Feminine who has the inexhaustible power to procreate and sustain her countless children. (Seung 2007: 190/1).







In the text, the following abbreviations of Kant’s work have been used.

PP 		Perpetual Peace in Reiss ed 1991
UH		Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose in Reiss ed
CF		Contest of the Faculties in Reiss ed
TP		Theory and Practice in Reiss ed
WE		What is Enlightenment? in Reiss ed
GMM		Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals
R		Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone
DV		Doctrine of Virtue
LE		Lectures on Ethics
A		Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View
CJ		Critique of Judgment
MEJ		The Metaphysical Elements of Justice 
Saw		On the Old Saw: That May Be Right in Theory But It Won't Work in Practice
CPuR		Critique of Pure Reason
CPrR		Critique of Practical Reason
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